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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Voluntary action represents a fundamental behavior in our daily life in which we 
constantly decide what to do next1. Are we getting to work by train or by car? Read 
a book or go to the gym in the evening? Work or visit a friend at the weekend? 
Human action is inseparably linked to decisions of this kind. The concept of volition 
tries to explain our past and future actions, to others as well as to ourselves.  
 
Along with controlled action comes a specific conscious experience well known to 
each of us: the experience of conscious will and control, the characteristic feeling 
that I am the author of the action. This experience of conscious will and voluntary 
control is a most central feature of human self–conception. However, the intuition 
that our intentions are the immediate causal triggers to our actions and their sensory 
consequences has been challenged by several findings. It has been shown that the 
processes which trigger intentional actions are often unconscious (e.g., Libet, 
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, 1985). Both, initiation and selection of our 
                                                 
1 In psychology, the term ‘behavior’ refers to the entirety of physical and psychological activities 
expressed by an individual with respect to his current environment (Dorsch Psychologisches 
Lexikon). In contrast to this rather inclusive concept of human activity, the term ‘action’ is defined 
more narrowly. ‘Action’ refers to a delimited unit of activity which is directed towards the realisation 
of a goal (e.g., Hacker, 1998; Hommel, 2002; Lewin, 1926; Rubinstein, 1984; Volpert, 1974). Action-goals 
are anticipated future effects which can be realized by an action (e.g., a particular event in the 
environment, a desired emotional state of an individual), (Prinz, 1998, 2000; Hommel, 2002). In the 
present work, the terms ‘behavior’ and ‘action’ will be used according to this differential 
understanding. 
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voluntary actions are systematically affected by stimuli which are not consciously 
perceived by the actor (Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Klapp 
& Hinkley, 2002; Wendt–Kürschner, 2006). People often misjudge the extent to 
which outcomes are a result of their intentional behavior. Illusory control occurs 
when people overestimate the impact of their actions on events in the world (e.g., 
Langer, 1975; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Wegner & Wheately, 1999; Wegner, 2002). In 
every day life this happens for instance in superstitious action.  In superstitions 
action people infer causality between their action and a subsequent event because 
they observed a repeated co–occurrence between a particular action (e.g., bring a 
talisman to an exam) and a subsequent event (e.g., get a good grade) even though, 
in fact, the relationship is not causal (Haggard, 2005). In a similar way the sense of 
authorship can go erroneously astray. Feelings of involuntariness for actions and 
effects which are actually self–caused are sometimes reported by people who are 
under hypnosis (e.g., Spanos, 1986; Lynn, Rhue &  Weekes, 1990; Kirsch & Lynn, 
1998; Haggard, Cartledge, Dafydd, & Oakley, 2004) or by people who are engaged 
in spiritual games (e.g., table turning), (Carpenter, 1888; Janet, 1889; Solomons & 
Stein, 1896). Moreover, such delusions of control are experienced by patients with 
specific psychiatric and neurological disorders such as schizophrenia, dissociative 
identity disorder, or the alien hand syndrome. It happens as a part of the clinical 
picture that some patients with these disorders misattribute self–caused actions to 
an external cause and feel their thoughts and actions to be controlled by external 
agents2 or forces. Other patients, to the contrary, may erroneously feel in control 
over actions or events which are in reality externally caused such as other peoples’ 
thoughts and actions or coincident events which they observe in the world. The 
mechanisms which underlie these dissociations have only begun to be understood 
(e.g., Frith, 1992, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Spence, 2001; Jahanshahi 
& Frith, 1998). 
                                                 
2 In the current work, the term ‘agent’ refers to organisms, in particular humans, which constantly 
interact with their environment. This interaction is mutual, i.e., the interaction affects not only the 
sensors of the agent himself but also the environment he interacts with.  
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The study of volition thus has to address at least two major questions: (1) what are 
the basic processes leading to action? (2) What are the processes generating the conscious 
experience of authorship and voluntary control?  The current work is primarily 
dedicated to the latter issue.  
 
According to a widely held view voluntary action is closely tied to our ability to 
mentally represent the future effects of our actions (cf., Lotze, 1852; James, 
1890/1950; Michotte, 1954/1963; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Prinz, 1997, 1998, 2000; 
Goschke, 2003). Recent conceptions of voluntary action and experienced authorship 
have proposed that such mental representations or effect–anticipations also play a 
central role in the generation of the conscious experience of voluntary control. 
According to one concept accurate predictions or anticipations of action-effects lead 
to self–attribution of authorship and control because a match between actual and 
predicted consequences of an action produces an attenuation of the sensory 
representation of the perceived effects (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000, 
2002; Frith, 2005). According to the second concept correct previews of action–
effects lead to the retrospective perception of an apparent causal link between one's 
intention and action (e.g., Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004; Wegner & Wheateley, 1999). 
Based on the common core assumptions of these approaches the present work 
attempted to specify the role of effect-anticipation in the generation of the 
experience of voluntary control. The basic hypothesis was that the experience of 
control emerges from a comparison between anticipated and actual action–effects: if 
an event that follows an action as its potential effect is correctly anticipated before 
the action the event will be experienced as self–caused. Conversely if no or an 
incorrect effect–anticipation has occurred control will be attributed to an external 
cause rather than to the self. Specific consideration was given to the question of 
whether such effect anticipations must be available to consciousness or whether 
effect-anticipations can affect conscious control also on an unconscious level. In four 
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experiments the effects of unconscious effect–anticipation on the experience of 
action control were investigated.   
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview over theoretical approaches and empirical findings 
concerning the mechanisms which underlie action control and – in particular – 
concerning the processes involved in generating experienced agency and control.  
Since obviously, voluntary action, conscious control and authorship–experience are 
not exclusively psychological issues, Chapter 2 will at first focus on the 
philosophical question of whether our voluntary actions are "free" or causally 
determined by external antecedents. The central positions taken in this debate on 
‘freedom of will’ by libertarians, determinists and compatibilists will be outlined and 
discussed. Thereafter, the focus will shift on the cognitive features of voluntary action 
in general and the role of effect-anticipation in action control in particular. How do 
we acquire controlled action skills? What are the representational bases of action 
control? It will then be illuminated that actions are affected by effect-anticipations 
not only when they are conscious but even when they remain unavailable to 
awareness. The empirical findings on how unconscious effect-anticipations affect the 
control of forced- as well as freely chosen actions will be discussed with respect to 
our understanding of the role of conscious intention in action. The focus will then 
shift more narrowly on the question of the processes involved in generating the 
experience of voluntary control. Based on the hypothesis that effect-anticipations do 
not only affect the control of action but also experienced control, two recent 
theoretical approaches will be discussed: (1) Wegner’s concept of apparent mental 
causation and (2) the ‘sensory attenuation hypothesis’ proposed by Frith and 
colleagues’ internal forward model approach. Within this theoretical framework the 
aim of the current thesis, i.e., to investigate the influence of unconscious effect-
anticipations on the experience of voluntary control, will be elaborated.  Thereafter, 
in Chapter 3, own experiments to investigate this question are described.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
 
2. 1  The philosophical debate on freedom of will 
 
The subjective feeling of authorship and control is deeply embedded in our self–
conceptualization as autonomous intentional agents as well as in our common–
sense psychology (Goschke, 2003). As William James put it, “The whole sting and 
excitement of our voluntary life…depends on our sense that in it things are really 
being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of 
a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago” (1890/1950, Vol. 1, p. 453). 
 
To an actor the conscious experience of will appears to testify a privileged 
introspective access towards the mental antecedents of his voluntary actions. This in 
turn generates the impression that as an autonomous agent one could – in principle 
– have decided and acted otherwise, even under identical conditions (Walter, 1998). 
When asked why at this very moment you are reading these pages instead of going 
to the gym, lying in the sun, or giving your best friend the long due call your 
answer – supposed you were under no external coercion – probably will be that you 
did so because you decided  to do so. Could you have done otherwise? Of course you 
could, you might reply: if you had decided to go to the gym you would have done so 
(Goschke, 2003, 2004).  
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What appears so evident from introspection is the central issue of an old and at the 
same time very recent philosophical debate on the problem of the freedom of will 
which has been a principal topic of European philosophy and metaphysics since 
Descartes (1664) in general, and, since Kant (1788/1995) in the German 
philosophical tradition in particular. This debate is at its core a conflict between two 
contrary ideas. A so–called libertarian conception of free will is defended against a 
deterministic conception of voluntary action. The primary question of this classic 
dichotomy seems to be whether at least some of our actions are up to our free choice 
or whether they are determined by mechanisms beyond our conscious control 
(Wegner, 2002, 2004). An attempt to dissolve this antagonism has been made by 
compatibilists who have introduced a modified version of the traditional notion of 
freedom that is compatible with determinism (Walter, 1998; Bieri, 2001; Dennett, 
2003; Goschke, 2003; Pauen, 2004). 
 
In the last couple of years the subject of free will has become a major issue of a 
public scientific debate which is carried out via newspapers' feuilletons. Why is 
there so much concern? The way we account for the question of free will has 
profound practical and ethical implications because it is closely linked to the 
concept of moral responsibility, especially in the western cultures (Walter, 1998; 
Wegner, 2002; Goschke, 2003; Bieri, 2001). Our moral evaluation of an action 
depends crucially on whether we regard it as a willed action, or as an automatic 
response. Yet, would it make sense to disapprove a person for an act we despise and 
cherish another for an act we appreciate if, ultimately, these actions were 
determined by antecedents beyond the person's conscious control? In this respect 
the issue of conscious will is taken up in most civilized penal systems. Judgment is 
based on the principle of mens rea, 'a guilty mind' (Hart, 1968, p. 114) according to 
which the state of mind indicating the culpability of a delinquent is required as an 
element of crime. Conversely, criminal responsibility is dismissed in case of 
diagnosed "disturbances of consciousness in persons who retain the capacity to 
engage in goal–directed conduct based on prior learned responses" (Bonnie, 
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Coughlin, Jeffries, & Low, 1997, p. 107). Thus, we judge and punish someone when 
we believe that he decided consciously and could in principle have done otherwise 
– under identical conditions.  
 
Libertarianism 
 
The Libertarian concept of free will implies several premises which largely 
correspond to what most people refer to when intuitively speaking of free will and 
voluntary action. The first premise includes the belief that human behavior is not 
determined by external conditions. This implies the idea that even under completely 
identical conditions one could have decided otherwise. The second premise holds 
that the very origin of the causal chain leading to action resides in the actor himself 
in that his 'conscious self' generates the decisions and intentions leading to action. 
Third, the decisions made by an agent are intelligible and rational: actions are 
chosen for good reasons with respect to the agent's beliefs, desires and intentions 
(Walter, 1998, 2004).  
 
The belief that human behavior is not determined by external causes, but is the 
result of conscious choices made by agents' conscious selves entails both dualism 
and mind–body causation: A conscious thought (intention) would need to activate 
the motor areas in the brain and set in motion the relevant muscles to realize an 
action. Mental–to–physical causation, however, contradicts the scientific assumption 
that the world is causally closed and determined. Such approaches are therefore 
incompatible with naturalistic conceptions of voluntary action which assume that 
intentions – as mental states in general – are realized in neural processes (e.g., 
Haggard, 2005; Goschke, 2003; see also Lautenbacher & Gauggel, 2004).  
 
Determinism 
 
Determinism claims that all events – including intentions, decisions, actions and 
their effects – are inevitably set by past events. In the case of physical determinism, 
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it is assumed that a current state of the world A together with the laws of nature 
necessarily leads to a particular future state of the world B (Walter, 1998). According 
to deterministic conceptions of voluntary action, this principle applies to human 
action as well. Thus, it is supposed that actions are a causal consequence from 
distinct psychological states, such as for instance current constellations of desires 
and beliefs which themselves are results of factors like for instance genetics, 
experience, culture, and many more others. In concert with the given situational 
constraints, they bring forth just one particular intention and the corresponding 
action (Wegner, 2004). What prevents us from tracking back this causal chain and 
thus leads us to invent mental causation as an alternative explanation is in this view 
merely a consequence of our limited epistemic access (e.g., Singer, 2004; 
Markowitsch, 2004). 
 
In conclusion, determinism implies that the causal chain of each action leads back to 
antecedents which have occurred in the remote past. This seems to entail that, 
ultimately, our intentions and actions are caused by mechanisms beyond our control 
(Van Inwagen, 1983). Clearly, it rules out that an actor could have decided 
otherwise under identical conditions. Accepting determinism in the context of 
willed action thus raises several questions: Can we hold on to the common 
conceptual differentiation between voluntary actions on the one hand and involuntary 
responses on the other? Is determinism at all reconcilable with an idea of free will 
and our common notion of moral responsibility? Or would we, as Benjamin Libet 
(1999) has portrayed it, be "...essentially sophisticated automata, with conscious 
feelings and intentions tacked on as epiphenomena with no causal power" (Libet, 
1999, p. 47)? 
 
Indeterminism and agency – the libertarian dilemma  
 
Claiming that freedom must imply 'genuine' choice, that is, an actor must have the 
possibility to decide otherwise under identical conditions and constraints, the hard–
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line libertarian should reject the idea to reconcile 'freedom' with a deterministic 
concept of voluntary action. As it turns out, however, libertarian indeterminism 
raises a conceptual dilemma of its own. This dilemma refers to the fact that 
indeterministic events are random or arbitrary events (Bieri, 2001; Walter, 2004; 
Goschke, 2003; Wegner, 2002; Dennett, 1984). Yet, freedom of will is appreciated to 
guide actions with respect to the agent and thus in a non–random and rather 
systematic way. Undetermined will would be a mechanism unresponsive to past 
influences of any kind – at least not responsive in a systematic way. Action would 
then rely on arbitrary and unpredictable – ultimately random – decisions (Wegner, 
2002). If actions were as such immune to past influence, how should they be 
intelligible? How should they relate to the personal 'self' of the actor including his 
experiences, basic beliefs and current desires?  
 
The observation that, in fact, indeterminism subverts authorship rather than 
preserving it has been recognized as early as in 1910 by William James asking, “If a 
'free act' be a sheer novelty, that comes not from me, the previous me, but ex nihilo, 
and simply tacks itself on to me, how can I, the previous I, be responsible?" (James, 
1910/1963, p. 53). As it turns out, indeterminism itself is irreconcilable with one 
basic libertarian intuition related to free will: agent–responsibility.  
 
Apparently, this evokes the conclusion that freedom of will as we “feel” it exists 
neither in a deterministic nor in an indeterministic world. An alternative strategy, 
however, would be to redefine the notion of freedom reconciling it with causal 
determinism. This has been attempted by compatibilists. 
 
Compatibilism 
 
Compatibilists argue that determinism is a precondition rather than the barrier of 
personal authorship and control: voluntary actions are related to an actor in that 
they are causally determined by his beliefs, desires, and intentions (Beckermann, 
2004; Walter, 1998, 2004; Bieri, 2001; Dennett, 1984; Goschke, 2003, 2004, 2006). 
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According to Goschke intentions are "constraints" rather than "immediate triggering 
causes" of our voluntary actions which "modulate the readiness of responses to 
become activated by specific stimuli" (Goschke, 2003, pp. 50–51). In compatiblistic 
terms, voluntary actions differ from involuntary responses not because they are 
undetermined but because they are determined in a different way. As the 
philosopher Daniel Dennett has put it, "Determinism is the friend, not the foe, of 
those who dislike inevitability" (Dennett, 2003, p. 60; also Beckermann, 2004).  
Admittedly, this weakened notion of freedom implies that we could not have acted 
differently under identical conditions and abandons thus one basic intuition related 
to ‘free’ will (Walter, 1998; Goschke, 2004). Besides, it is controversial whether 
compatibilism can resolve the problem of moral responsibility (Beckmann, 2004; see 
also Goschke & Walter, 2005; Walter & Goschke, 2006). However, the compatibilistic 
concept fits with the scientific purposes of experimental psychology and 
neuroscience because it implies that the causal antecedents of voluntary action are 
mechanisms that are open to empirical causal analysis (Prinz, 2000, 2004).  Thus, 
given that we can specify how voluntary actions differ from involuntary responses 
‘objectively’ compatibilism does permit us to maintain the concept of voluntariness 
in avoiding indeterministic dilemmata and dualism.  
 
Accordingly, what the compatibilistic approach assigns to cognitive scientists is to 
specify the neuro–cognitive aspects which distinguish voluntary action from more 
basic categories of behavior such as automatic responses, reflexes or habits. To 
illustrate this point, consider the following example: To an actor, there is a marked 
experiential difference between the movement of his hand when he – reflexively – 
pulls his hand back from, say, an electric fence compared to when he – voluntarily – 
beckons the waiter in the restaurant to order the bill. To an external observer, 
however, this difference is not obvious. The following chapter will thus address to 
the cognitive features which characterize voluntary action. At the beginning of the 
chapter, different levels of action control will be discussed. From the cognitive 
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features that characterize actions at lower levels of control such as reflexes and 
habitual responses the chapter focus will turn to voluntary action. In this respect it 
will be addressed that voluntary action which – at the highest level of action control 
– is to be distinguished from reflexes or habitual responses by the cognitive feature 
to anticipate the potential future effects (goals) of their actions. 
 
 
 
2. 2 Cognitive features of voluntary action 
 
2. 2. 1 The role of effect–anticipation in voluntary action 
 
 
In the course of evolution organisms have developed different forms of action 
control. The progress in this development is characterized by a gradual increase in 
behavioral flexibility, i.e., in the degree to which behavior can be selected 
independent from a current external environment or a present internal state 
(Goschke, 2002, 2004, 2006).  
 
At the most basic level innate reflexes constitute the least flexible form of behavior. 
Innate reflexes are controlled by predetermined response programs which are 
automatically and inevitably triggered in a fixed fashion by fixed external stimulus 
conditions. An example of a behavior which is controlled in this way is the patella 
reflex. 
 
Another form of behavior is need-state-driven behavior. Different from reflexes, trigger 
stimuli are located not only in the environment but also ‘within’ the organism with 
respect to its current motivational- or need-state. The current need state of an 
organism, e.g., hunger, sets the respective response program, eat, in a state of 
readiness. Thus, need-states do not immediately trigger responses in a fixed way 
but when appropriate trigger stimuli are available the behavior is executed. For 
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example, a food-deprived fruit fly will inevitably proceed to food when available. In 
humans need-states also set ready the need-correspondent action-program. For 
instance, when actions are merely need-state-controlled the desire for sugar would 
lead an organism to consume chocolate as soon as available.  
 
A somewhat increased degree of behavioral flexibility becomes evident in habitual 
responsive behavior which is provided by procedural learning. Procedural learning 
enables organisms to modify or expand behavioral dispositions on the long run 
corresponding to individual experiences. However, the formation is slow and once a 
habit is formed modification possibilities and flexibility are limited. 
 
The evolutionary step-stone to behavioral flexibility occurs in voluntary action which 
we know as humans. In contrast to innate reflexes, need-state-driven behavior, and 
habitual responses, voluntary action is - by definition - directed to goals (e.g., 
Hoffmann, 1993; Jeannerod, 1994; Goschke, 1996; Prinz, 1997, 1998, 2000; Jahanshahi 
& Frith, 1998; Dörner, 1999; Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Schall, 2001). In terms of a 
definition given by Prinz (1997) goals are intended future effects. Voluntary action 
thus invokes an essential cognitive ability: the ability to form internal 
representations of future action–effects (James, 1890/1950; Lotze, 1852; Michotte, 
1954/1963; Hoffmann, 1993; Hommel, 1998, 2000, 2003; Elsner & Hommel, 2001, 
2004; Goschke, 2000, 2003). On the time scale such effect–anticipations vary from 
instant sensory experiences of a separate act, - e.g., the experience how splendid it 
tastes when I enter a piece of chocolate into my mouth, - to long term consequences 
of actions, - e.g., that I will feel sick within the next hour if I finish the whole bar or 
that I will gain weight within a few years if I eat chocolate every day. Importantly, 
the possibility to select action with respect to anticipated action effects liberates 
actors from both the current stimulus environment, e.g., chocolate available, and the 
present desire or need state, e.g., to consume sugar (Goschke, 1996, 2000, 2003).  
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Thus, in contrast to reflexive responses which are triggered by currently available 
stimuli and mediated via fixed neuronal pathways voluntary actions are based on 
internal representations of future effects of actions and goals as well as on 
evaluations of these anticipated future states with respect to values, beliefs, 
intentions and desires of an individual actor (e.g., Rubinstein, 1984; Goschke, 2003, 
2006). In this view an actor's hand–movement pulling it back from an electric fence 
differs from the superficially similar movement of beckoning the waiter to order the 
bill. The latter is selected in terms of its anticipated consequences, i.e., the intention 
to pay the bill and leave the restaurant.  
 
This conclusion leads directly to the question of how we learn to control actions in 
terms of effect–anticipations and goals. It will be addressed in the next section.  
 
The acquisition of action control – The ideomotor principle 
 
The idea that effect–anticipations play a key role in the control of voluntary action 
has a long history. Inspired by his predecessors Lotze (1852) and Harleß (1861), 
William James was among the first to note that voluntary action is based on “...the 
anticipation of the movements´ sensible effects, resident or remote…” (James, 
1890/1950, Vol. 2, p. 521). Central to James' celebrated essay on the cognitive 
principles of 'will' is the proposal that action control relies on an ideo–motor principle. 
The ideo-motor principle holds that ideas – mental representations of intended 
actions and their effects – can evoke the actions which have been learned to produce 
them. According to the ideo-motor principle two processes are involved in the 
acquisition of controlled action. First, randomly produced movements lead to 
particular changes in the environment (perceptual effects); the respective motor 
pattern is then associated with its effect. Secondly, once such an action-effect 
association has been acquired, action control occurs because actions are 
automatically activated by anticipating their consequences (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Action control according to the ideomotor principle. Two mechanisms are involved. (1) 
Initially, actions which are incidentally generated produce specific changes in the 
environment. The motor pattern of that action is then associated with that effect in a 
bidirectional way. Once action effect associations are obtained, action control occurs (2) on 
the basis that actions are automatically elicited by anticipating their effects.  
 
 
The claim that the learning of skilled voluntary action occurs based on a two stage 
learning process paved the way for contemporary theories of voluntary action. A 
recent approach which was taken on this issue will be addressed in the following 
chapter.  
 
The acquisition of controlled action: a two–stage model 
 
In the spirit of the pioneering work of James, Lotze, and Harleß in the 19th century, 
Elsner and Hommel (2001, 2004) proposed a model of action control which describes 
the mechanisms underlying the acquisition of action skills. Based on the idea that 
associations between actions and their effects are functional in action–control, their 
conception puts forth that these associations are acquired in a two–stage learning 
process. In the first stage, actions are generated at random. The sensory effects 
which follow from these actions are perceived, registered and stored in memory (see 
also Piaget, 1952). For example, a baby which – initially random – moves it legs. By 
chance it happens to kick toy–rattle above its bed. The baby might do this over and 
Bidirectional Association ACTION EFFECT 
(1) 
EFFECT ACTION Automatic Activation 
(2) 
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over again such that, after some time, when the movement–effect co–incidence has 
occurred repeatedly the baby will register this co-occurrence. At the next step, the 
baby will move its legs on purpose to achieve the - now anticipated or desired -  
effect. That is, if a particular action, e.g., leg movement, and an effect, e.g., rattling, 
co–occur regularly the two events are, at the second stage, bi–directionally 
associated. Bi–directional associations of actions and their effects provide that 
representations action effects, e.g. mobile clacking, co–activate the motor pattern 
suitable to produce it, e.g., leg moving. It is suggested that this learning mechanism 
proceeds largely automatic. That means that no explicit intention, conscious effort or 
intentional assignment of attention is required to acquire bi–directional action–effect 
associations. Rather this learning process is supposed to happen incidentally by 
acting (Hommel, 1996). 
 
To test their model empirically Elsner and Hommel (2001) conducted an experiment 
which consisted of two phases. In an initial learning phase participants were 
instructed to perform left and right key–presses. While doing this they observed co–
occurrences between their key–presses and high– and low–pitched tones which 
followed the key–presses as effects. In order to establish incidental learning the 
action–outcome co–occurrences were irrelevant to the task and remained 
unmentioned in the instruction. In a subsequent test–phase the former effect–tones 
were used as imperative stimuli now indicating a mapped left– or right key–press 
response. The mapping of key and target was either consistent or inconsistent with 
the associations that had been learned in the previous acquisition phase. In 
accordance with the assumption that learned action–effect co–occurrences would on 
the second stage become functional to the control of action it was predicted that 
responses in the test–phase would be faster when the key–target mapping was 
consistent with key–effect mapping in the learning–phase compared to when it was 
inconsistent. This prediction was supported by the data. Depending on the learned 
action–effect associations participants responded faster and more accurate in the 
consistent than in the inconsistent mapping condition. This was considered as 
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evidence that learning of action–outcome co–occurrences proceeds automatically 
and leads to bi–directional action–effect associations which. These acquired bi–
directional action–effect associations become in turn functional to the control of 
action. Actions are controlled in terms of the effects which have been learned to 
produce them (Elsner & Hommel, 2001, 2004; Prinz, 1997, 1998; Kunde, Hoffmann, 
& Zellmann, 2002).  
 
In a subsequent experiment which was part of the same study Elsner and Hommel 
(2001) tested whether anticipations of bi–directional action–effect associations 
would also influence the selection of actions which could be freely chosen by the 
participants. The paradigm was the same as in the first experiment, except for one 
major modification: the test phase now consisted of a free–choice task. As in the first 
experiment participants first observed action–outcome co–incidences. In the 
following free–choice test–phase the former effects were shown before an unspecific 
go–signal which indicated participants to freely choose whether to press a left or a 
right key. Results revealed that the learned associations had systematically 
modulated participants’ responses also under free–choice conditions: they selected 
more key–presses that were consistent with the learned associations than key–
presses which were inconsistent with the learned action–event mapping. Thus, even 
though participants had been “free” to select whether to perform a right or a left 
key–press, their choices were biased by the learned associations (see also Kunde, 
Koch, & Hoffmann, 2004).  
 
Taken together, these results support the idea that bi–directional action–effect 
associations which are acquired automatically in a bi–phasic learning process play 
an essential role in the initiation and selection of both pre–determined and freely 
chosen actions. How are these associations represented in the brain?  
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2. 2. 2  Representational bases of controlled action 
 
Goal–directed interaction with the world involves both movement to realize an 
action and perception to register sensory events in the environment as possible 
action–effects. Perception, as an afferent process, starts with stimuli from the 
environment. These stimuli produce patterns of stimulation in sense organs and 
generate sensory codes in the brain. Movement, as an efferent process, originates in 
the motor codes of the brain. These motor codes represent certain patterns of 
activity and set in motion the relevant motor effectors to realize an action. Due to 
the fact that "…even the simplest behavior is assembled from both perception and 
action…" (Massaro, 1990, p. 135; see also Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 
2001), the achievement of a goal depends crucially on the efficient co–operation 
between perception and action (Prinz, 1997, 1998; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2001; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). Two general ideas on how perception 
and action are represented in the brain in order to interact functionally have been 
proposed.  
 
Separate coding of perception and action 
 
The first idea goes back to Descartes (1664) who assumed separate pathways and 
different principles of processing for perception and action. In the spirit of his times, 
he pictured processing in the human sensory–motor system in terms of mechanics 
and hydraulics with the pineal gland on top of the hierarchy as an executive control 
instance to co–ordinate sensory input and motor output.  Afferent conduction was 
described mechanically. The idea was that sensory input 'plucks at specific nerve 
fibers which terminate in the pineal gland. The pineal gland was supposed to 
'translate' input from afferent mechanics by releasing a specific pattern of ‘nerve 
fluid’ into the efferent system. This ‘translation’ was assumed to cause hydraulic 
pressure onto the corresponding motor effectors. The hydraulic pressure was 
thought to finally elicit movement execution. Today we know that the pineal gland 
 Chapter 2:  Theoretical Background                                                                                  18 ___________________________________________________________________________
  
produces melantonine and is involved in controlling circadian and seasonal 
rhythmics, e.g., sleep, (Carlson, 2004).    
 
Since Descartes, traditional models of pereptuo-motor interaction have adapted the 
view that perception and action are separate in terms of their representational status 
and their underlying control processes. The translation metaphor has therefore long 
remained the standard way to describe perceptuo–motor interaction in humans. For 
instance, Welford (1968) proposed a computational model according to which the 
human sensory–motor system operates on the basis of three separate divisions of 
central mechanisms: (1) perception, (2) translation of perception into action, and (3) 
control/execution of action. According to this view, motor action, e.g., in a choice–
reaction task, occur in three separate stages: in the first stage sensory data, e.g., 
received from the imperative stimulus, are processed in terms of action–relevant 
information that is stored in memory, e.g., a present goal or task instruction. After 
sufficient processing these data are passed on to the second stage, where the 
translation mechanism converts sensory information into 'response orders' that are 
sent to the motor system. At this third stage, the muscular movements are 
programmed to execute the action, e.g., a manual key–press (Welford, 1968; also 
Sanders, 1980; Sternberg, 1969; Massaro, 1990). 
 
The view that perception and action control rely on distinct functional principles 
and constitute separate and strictly sequential stages of processing has been 
challenged by several empirical findings. For instance, response–time data obtained 
in choice–reaction tasks have attested that perceptual processing and response 
activation are temporarily overlapping rather than strictly serial: the impact of 
sensory information on response processes is evident before stimulus processing is 
completed (e.g., Smid, Mulder, & Mulder, 1990). Even stimuli which are delivered 
subliminally and remain thus below the threshold of conscious awareness elicit 
response activation processes (e.g., Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Klotz & Neumann, 
1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003). The processing of unconsciously presented 
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stimuli exceeds up to semantic levels of representation (e.g., Dehaene, Naccache, Le 
Clec'H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene–Lambertz, van de Moortele, & LeBihan, 1998; 
Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, LeBihan, Mangin, Poline, & Riviere, 2001; Kiefer & 
Spitzer, 2000).  
 
The stimulus–response compatibility effect discovered first by Simon, Hinrichs and 
Craft (1970) is also difficult to reconcile with a separate–coding approach. The 
stimulus–response compatibility effect describes the well–documented 
phenomenon observed in choice reaction tasks that responses are faster when 
perceived targets share certain features, e.g., spatial arrangement with the responses 
assigned to them compared to when no such feature correspondence exists. For 
instance, responses in forced choice reaction tasks a faster and more accurate when a 
stimulus that appears right of a central fixation–point requires a right key–press and 
a stimulus located on the left side requires a left key–press compared to when the 
task set requires an opposite mapping (cf. Prinz, 1997). 
 
To account for such compatibility effects it has been suggested that compatibility–
based performance facilitation arises because shared features evoke corresponding 
overlaps of the cognitive representations of perceptual targets and the motor 
responses assigned to them (e.g., Kornblum, 1994; Kornblum, Hasbrouq, & Osman, 
1990). This idea has gained essential support by the finding that compatibility 
effects arise not only when feature sharing is physically obvious, as in the case of 
correspondence in spatial arrangement of target and assigned response, but also 
when perceptuo–motor correspondence is less evident (Lippa, 1996). Together with 
Müsseler’s (1995) observation that the presentation of stimuli which share certain 
features with to be performed actions can also conflict with the execution of these 
actions these findings invoke a conception of the human sensory–motor system that 
stands in a marked contrast to the traditional Cartesian models of separate 
perceptuo– and motor processing: It implies a fundamental continuity in the 
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functional mechanisms of perception and action and the way they are represented 
in the brain.  
 
Common coding of perception, action and intended action–effects  
 
Basically, the idea that perception and action are similar both in terms of their 
contents and their representational status roots, once more, in the works of 
nineteenth century scientists such as Lotze (1852), Münsterberg (1888), James 
(1890/1950), and, somewhat later, Ach (1905). More recently, Wolfgang Prinz and 
his colleagues (Prinz, 1997, 1998; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; 
see also Kornblum, Hasbrouq, & Osman, 1990) have proposed a model in the spirit 
of this approach. The core assumption of this conception is that perceptuo–motor 
interaction in humans relies on a common coding principle. Due to a principal 
similarity in the functional mechanisms which underlie perception and action 
perceptual events which share specific features with the actions that are assigned to 
them will be encoded in a common representational domain. This provides 
immediate continuity at the perception–action interface: a sensory event which 
activates a perceptual pattern in the brain automatically co–activates the related 
motor pattern, as both are encoded within the same representational medium. The 
co–activated motor code can in turn elicit the execution of the respective response. A 
translation or any other kind of mediation at the perception–action interface as it is 
required in separate coding models becomes obsolete under common coding 
conditions (Prinz, 1997; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001).  
 
Importantly, common coding is not restricted to sensory events which are perceived 
in a current environment. Rather, as it has been revealed in a study by Hommel 
(1993), common coding includes also sensory events which are associated to certain 
actions as intended effects or goals of planned actions (Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997). In a modified version of the Simon–task 
(Simon, Hinrichs, & Craft, 1970) participants were instructed to press either a left or 
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a right key to indicate whether they had been delivered a high– or a low–pitched 
tone. The tones were presented via headphones either to the left– or to the right ear, 
but of relevance to participants' forced–choice response was only the dimension 
'tone–pitch'. 'Tone–location' was irrelevant and thus to be ignored by participants. 
Subsequent to each key–press a light went on which was either located on the left or 
on the right side of the computer screen. This was the effect of participants’ key–
presses. Participants were assigned to two groups receiving different instructions. 
The control group received the standard Simon–task instruction, i.e., to press left or 
right key to indicate whether high– or low–pitched tone had been delivered and 
ignore the lights. The experimental group received a modified instruction and was 
asked to illuminate either the left– or right–sided light to indicate tone pitch. In 
contrast to the control group the response–keys remained unmentioned. Thus, the 
instruction (task set) established in the control group referred to the action (key–
press), the task set established in the experimental group referred to the intended 
action–effect (light–location). The patterns of results that were obtained for the 
groups reflected exactly the difference between the two task sets. In the control 
group, participants' response pattern reflected a standard Simon–effect: 
performance varied depending on the correspondence between the locations of tone 
presentation and the location of the response–keys. Responses were faster for 
corresponding compared to opposite locations of tone–presentation and response–
keys. Yet, in the experimental group participants’ performance varied depending on 
the correspondence between location of tones and location of the intended action–
effects: responses were faster when tone and light appeared on the same compared to 
when they appeared on opposite sides. The formerly critical relationship between 
the location of tones the response–keys was now of no differential impact to the 
responses. It was therefore concluded that common coding holds not only for 
actions and their perceptual antecedents, e.g., imperative target stimuli, as triggers 
of actions, but also for actions and their associated sensory consequences as 
anticipated/intended future effects.  
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Such shared 'event–codes' for actions and the sensory consequences assigned to 
them establish a bi–directional and continuous relationship between action and 
effects and allow intentional action selection to be controlled in terms of the 
perceptual effects that they should generate (Prinz, 1997, 1998; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Jordan, 2003). Based on anticipated action goals the 
selection and initiation of voluntary actions is decoupled from immediate physical 
presence of external trigger–stimuli. 
 
After having considered aspects concerning the basic cognitive and representational 
properties of voluntary action it will now be turned to the more phenomenal aspects 
of volition. The following chapter will focus on the role of consciousness in the 
control of voluntary action. Two issues will be addressed: (1) what is the role of 
unconscious processes in the selection and initiation of voluntary action? (2) What is the 
role of unconscious processes in the generation of the subjective experience of volition and 
control?  
 
 
 
2. 3  Unconscious processes in intentional action 
 
Based on our common experience as intentional agents probably all of us will agree 
that voluntary action is closely tied to intuitive conceptions of 'self'. The most 
powerful intuition in this respect refers to the ‘self’ as a ‘device’ that controls and 
monitors our interaction with the environment. In mediating between stimulus 
input and behavioral output the ‘self’ is supposed to consciously trigger our 
intentional actions. In this view intentions are the conscious commands which the 
'self' transmits to the executing motor systems, thereby causing action (Goschke & 
Walter, 2005; see also Wegner, 2002; Jordan, 2003). In contrast to this intuition, 
however, results from experimental studies in psychology and the cognitive 
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neurosciences have shown that the processes which underlie the control of 
voluntary actions operate largely unconscious. The electroencephalography (EEG) 
studies of Benjamin Libet and his colleagues (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; 
Libet, 1985, 1993, 1996) were amongst the first attempting to investigate whether our 
actions are in fact caused by conscious intentions and voluntary decisions or 
whether they rely on unconscious brain processes evading our conscious control. By 
tracking the time course of experienced intention and electrophysiological onset of 
motor activity these studies revealed an apparently intriguing finding: the conscious 
experience of intention follows rather than precedes the onset of movement 
preparation. This result was received with surprise as, being a candidate cause, the 
experience of intention should occur prior rather than subsequent to movement 
onset (Michotte, 1954/1963; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2005). 
Libet's results and his concluding rejection of intentional causality in voluntary 
action were subject to a most controversially debated target article in Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences published in 1985. Because, to date, the original study of Libet, 
Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) is considered a 'classic' in this field it will be 
reported in the following section. 
 
 
2. 3. 1 The Libet–study 
 
In the Libet–study, participant's basic task was to voluntarily lift the index finger of 
their dominant hand whenever they felt the “urge”, i.e., the conscious intention to 
do so while they were focusing a clock hand rotating every 2.65 seconds (s) on a 
screened clock. A random time later, the clock hand stopped and participants were 
asked to report the position of the clock hand by the time they had first felt the urge 
to move. This so called “W–judgment” occurred on average 206 milliseconds (ms) 
before the visible execution of the movement. Yet, during this task, Libet and 
colleagues had also measured the preparatory brain activity which precedes 
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voluntary action. This so–called readiness potential (RP) – originally discovered by 
Kornhuber and Deecke in 1965 – is an electrophysiological index which indicates 
motor preparation. Its negative shift of the electroencephalogram begins at 
approximately 1 s prior to a voluntary movement, and then grows gradually to a 
maximum just before movement execution. In Libet's participants, the onset of the 
RP preceded the W–judgment by several hundred milliseconds (see Figure 2). This 
chronometric order of measurable brain activity and the conscious awareness of 
“wanting” led the authors to conclude that the initiation of action involves an 
unconscious neural process, which generates both muscular activity and the 
conscious experience of intention. Libet and his associates (1983) concluded this to 
indicate that conscious intentions are an epiphenomenal result rather than the cause 
of the processes underlying a voluntary movement with both of them evading 
conscious access and control of actors (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, 
1985; Libet, 1996).  
 
Figure 2. Schematic view of the results obtained by Libet and colleagues (1983), adapted from 
Haggard, (2005). The onset of neural preparation in the motor cortex precedes movement 
onset approximately 1 s. The conscious intention to move follows the movement onset by 
about 206 ms. Because causes precede effects conscious intention appears not to be the 
immediate cause of the neural processes leading to action.  
 
Libet (1999, 2004) himself attempted to maintain the idea of a causal functionality of 
conscious will in the performance of a voluntary action. He referred to the 
opportunity to affect the final outcome the unconsciously initiated action 
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immediately before its execution by consciously blocking or vetoing it (Libet, 1985, 
1999). Libet (1999) argued that albeit consciousness of intention (W) follows the RP–
onset (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983) it precedes the initial activation of a 
muscle to execute a movement at approximately 150 ms. As Libet further pointed 
out this interval would be enough time for consciousness to intervene in the 
progress of the action process. To support their claim Libet et al. reported that 
participants were in fact capable to veto a movement planned for execution at a pre–
fixed point in time within the critical interval of 100 to 200 ms (Libet, Wright, & 
Gleason, 1983). Problematically, however, Libet proposed no answer as to whether 
the veto itself was elicited by unconscious neuronal processes.  
 
The controversial debate which had been evoked by the Libet–study addressed not 
only the possible philosophical and ethical implications concerning conscious will 
but also several methodological problems (see the replies to Libet’s target article in 
Behavior and Brain Sciences, 1985). A first major point pertained to the validity of 
the RP as being a valid correlate of intended movement. In fact, the RP is a rather 
unspecific electrophysiological marker which signifies a state of general alertness or 
readiness to move. However, it does not index the preparation of a specific planned 
voluntary movement. This became evident in a study by Keller and Heckhausen 
(1990). In an attempt to replicate Libet they found RPs also in the preparatory 
temporal interval preceding random incidental finger movements. Haggard and 
Eimer (1999) in turn conducted another replication of Libet's study. With respect to 
the problem uncovered by Keller and Heckhausen, Haggard and Eimer introduced 
an important modification. In contrast to Libet's original study their participants 
were asked to voluntarily lift the finger of either the left or the right hand whenever 
they felt the urge. This allowed the authors to measure the lateralized readiness 
potential (LRP) as a more specific marker of movement–preparation than the RP. As 
suggested by the name, the LRP indicates the body–side of the prepared movement. 
The LRP is based on event–related potentials which are recorded from the skullcap 
above the motor cortex fields that control movements of the left and right hand. It 
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reflects the relative level of left–hand and right–hand response tendencies with 
deflections occurring contra–lateral to the moving hand (e.g., Eimer, 1998; Coles, 
1989). Data analysis revealed that the time onset of the RP did not correlate with the 
time onset of the W–judgments. Yet, as consistent with the claim that conscious 
intention arises after the selection process as a consequence of the motor command 
for the chosen action the LRP–onsets were significantly ahead of participants’ W–
judgments.  
Apart from this, critics have argued that constant and variable errors are likely to be 
involved in the required mapping of the times of mental events (W–judgments) onto 
physical events (the spatial positions of the revolving clock). It has been questioned 
whether it is at all justified to plot them on the same scale (e.g., Dennett & 
Kinsbourne, 1992; Gomes, 1998, 2002).  
Another issue considered problematically refers to the validity of the W–judgments 
as markers of 'conscious intentions' or acts of 'will'. It has been argued that not the 
'urges' but the initial 'task set' instantiated at the beginning of the experiment 
constituted the critical antecedent and controlled participants’ performance in the 
Libet task (Goschke & Walter, 2005). Although this task set was not immediately 
conscious at the level of single trials it may have controlled behavior corresponding 
to the instructive task set throughout the experiment. Both the initiation of the 
single finger movements trial by trial and the experienced 'urges' would in this view 
rely on an intention that was conscious at the time it was initially formed, i.e., when 
participants received the experimental instruction (Prinz, 2000). In a related vein, 
Haggard (2005) considered problematic that the W–judgment variable implied the 
assumption that intentions can be spotted to just one moment in time. 
 
With respect to these methodological concerns Libet's results might have less 
substantial implication concerning the question of intentional causality in action. 
Nevertheless, the results have elucidated at least two essential points: firstly, the 
immediate causal triggers of our voluntary acts are not necessarily conscious and, 
secondly, conscious intentions play a less direct causal role in the control of action 
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than introspective intuition would suggest. Apart from this, Libet's time tracking 
method – albeit not unproblematic – offered one of the rare tools applicable to study 
the relationship between phenomenal and neural events in action. In this, the Libet–
study inspired a wealth of research in this field over the recent decades (e.g., 
Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Sirigu, Daprati, Ciancia, Giraux, Nighoghossian, 
Posada, & Haggard, 2004; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Haggard, 
Newman, & Magno, 1999; Haggard & Clark, 2003; Haggard & Magno, 1999; 
McCloskey, Colebatch, Potter, & Burke, 1983). The study has thus contributed to the 
long–due 'scientific revival' of volition as a topic of research.  
 
 
2. 3. 2  Unconscious modulation of forced–choice actions 
 
Another line of research revealing that not all antecedents to our voluntary actions 
are available to awareness comes from studies on unconscious processing. These 
studies have demonstrated that both the initiation and the selection of intentional 
actions are systematically affected by stimuli presented below the threshold of 
conscious awareness. Some of these studies will thus be reported in the following 
section. Because the methodology of masked priming used in these studies is directly 
relevant to the experimental approach of the present work it will be described in 
detail. 
 
The study of unconscious processing addresses the question whether stimuli which 
are not available to conscious perception have nevertheless a measurable and 
systematic impact on subsequent intentional actions (e.g., Vorberg, Mattler, 
Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2003; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; 
Kihlstrom, 2003; Snodgrass, Shevrin, & Kopka, 1993; Eriksen, 1960). A widely used 
paradigm in this domain is 'subliminal priming'. Conventional, i.e., conscious visual 
priming examines the impact of a formerly observed stimulus (prime) on the 
identification of a present stimulus (target). It is commonly measured by comparing 
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speed and accuracy of responses to the target on compatible trials, where prime and 
target are mapped to the same response, with speed and accuracy of responses to 
the target on incompatible trials, where prime and target indicate opposite 
responses. Prior experience with a stimulus enhances the identification of the same 
stimulus (e.g., Bar & Biederman, 1998; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998), one that is 
physically alike (e.g., Fiser & Biederman, 2001; Forster, Davis, Schoknecht, & Carter, 
1987), or semantically associated (e.g., Marcel, 1983; Cheesman & Merikle, 1986). In 
subliminal priming, where primes are presented only very briefly (less than 50 ms) 
and immediately masked3 such that they are not consciously perceived, the same 
priming–effects as under visible priming conditions are achieved (e.g., Cheesman & 
Merikle, 1986; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; Merikle & Reingold, 1998; 
Reingold & Merikle, 1990; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 
2003; Marcel, 1983; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2002, 
2003).  
 
Unconscious activation of forced-choice responses 
 
One of these studies using unconscious priming was conducted by Neumann & 
Klotz (1994). Participants’ task was to press a left or a right key to indicate which of 
two targets appeared on the computer screen. Targets consisted of a diamond or a 
square, each with star like inner contours (see Figure 3, left panel).  Each target was 
                                                 
3 'Visual masking' occurs when the perception of a briefly displayed stimulus (target) which is plainly 
visible, when shown alone, is reduced or prevented by the presentation of a second visual stimulus 
(mask). Critical in masking is the spatio-temporal proximity of target and mask. On the temporal 
dimension one distinguishes 'backward masking' (the mask is delivered after the prime) from 
'forward masking' (the mask is presented before the prime) and 'common onset masking' (target and 
mask are delivered simultaneously) and the mask continues to be displayed after the target has 
been deleted (e.g., Enns & Di Lollo, 2004; Di Lollo, Bischof, & Dixon, 1993). Concerning the spatial 
relationship between target and mask most studies use 'pattern-' or 'metacontrast'-masks. In ‘pattern 
masking’ masks are composed of various lines (or letters, digits, etc.) which randomly cover the 
target-shape (e.g., Breitmeyer, 1984; Turvey, 1973; Bachmann & Allik, 1976). In 'metacontrast 
masking, the mask tightly flankers the target-outlines without directly touching it (e.g., Fehrer & 
Raab, 1962; Breitmeyer, 1984; Weisstein, Ozog, & Szog, 1975; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Scharlau & 
Neumann, 2003; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 
2003). Another, more recently studied mask type is 'four dots' where the mask consists of four 
separate dots which loosely surround the target-shape (Enns & Di Lollo, 1997, 2004). 
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preceded by a prime. The primes consisted also of a diamond and a square, each a 
smaller replica of the targets. Prime-size was designed such that the primes fitted 
exactly into the inner contours of the target. This type of stimuli was used to 
produce metacontrast–masking (Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Scharlau & Neumann, 
2003).  Trials consisted of prime–target pairs which were either congruent, e.g., 
diamond prime followed by diamond target, incongruent, e.g., diamond prime 
followed by square target, or neutral, i.e., neutral prime followed by either diamond 
or square. It was predicted that the primes – albeit unavailable to conscious 
perception – would activate the response assigned to them. This activation would 
facilitate responses to targets mapped to the same compared to targets mapped to 
the opposite response as the preceding prime. As Figure 3 (right panel) shows, this 
was exactly the pattern shown by the data. Even though participants were in fact 
unable to detect the masked primes, as confirmed by accuracy rates at chance level 
in a prime–identification task, their responses were systematically modulated 
depending on the masked primes. Responses were substantially faster and more 
accurate on trials with congruent compared to trials with neutral or incongruent 
prime–target pairs. Thus, although the primes were unavailable to conscious 
awareness they had activated the response assigned to them by the task. 
 
Figure 3. Unconscious activation of forced-choice action as found in the experiment by Neumann & 
Klotz (1994). Left panel: Exemplary series of events on a trial. Right panel: Results show 
that responses were faster and more accurate after trials including congruent compared to 
incongruent prime target pairs. This indicates that even though the primes were not 
available to participants’ consciousness they had activated the response assigned to them. 
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Unconscious inhibition of forced-choice responses 
 
As it turned out, masked priming of target–related responses can – somewhat 
surprisingly at first sight – produce as well a response pattern opposite to the one 
observed by Neumann and Klotz (1994) such that a performance deficit – rather 
than benefit – occurs for congruent compared to incongruent prime–target–pairs. 
The phenomenon when participants produce slower responses and more errors on 
congruent compared to neutral or incongruent trials was first reported by Eimer & 
Schlaghecken (1998). It has been termed 'negative', 'incompatible' or 'reversed' 
priming effect and has since been studied extensively (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer, 
2000, 2001, 2002; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2001, 2002; Eimer, 1999; Praamstra & Seiss, 
2005; Aron, Schlaghecken, Fletcher, Bullmore, Eimer, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 
2003). The results obtained by Eimer and Schlagheck in their original study (1998) 
are shown in Figure 4. They used a forced–choice task which was basically similar 
to that applied by Neumann and Klotz (1994). However, as critical to the reversal of 
the result pattern, Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) had altered the timing of events 
on a trial. Specifically, the SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony) separating prime and 
target was prolonged such that the execution of the response to the target was 
delayed. Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) suggested this delay to be responsible for 
the reversal of the response pattern.  They argued that when response execution is 
delayed (because of the prolonged prime–target SOA) self–inhibitory control 
processes in intentional motor behavior intervene automatically and unconsciously 
and as such reverse the initial response–activation elicited by the prime (see also 
Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002). Evidence in support of the 'activation–followed–by–
inhibition hypothesis' (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004) was not only behavioral but 
also electrophysiological. The concomitant measurement of the LRP revealed a 
characteristic waveform. It is pictured in Figure 4 (lower panel). This waveform 
indicated an initial activation of the prime–related, i.e., the correct response 
immediately after prime–onset. In the EEG, this activation is visualized by a 
negative deflection from baseline level of activation contra–lateral to the prime–
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mapped hand (see Figure 4, lower panel). Approximately 350 - 400 ms after prime 
onset, the initial motorical activation is followed by a polarity–shift. This polarity 
shift indicates an inhibition of the initially activated (primed) response. Thus, it 
indicates a relative activation benefit of the non–primed (incorrect) response tendency. 
In the EEG, this ‘relative activation benefit’ is reflected by a positive deflection from 
baseline contra–lateral to the prime–mapped hand (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Praamstra & Seiss, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
By systematically varying mask–target SOA in a subsequent study this reversal was 
found to occur by rule with mask–target SOA exceeding a duration of 
approximately 90 ms (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000; Praamstra & Seiss, 2005), 
provided that the initial activation was sufficiently strong to have surpassed some 
Figure 4. Unconscious inhibition of forced-choice action. 
Behavioral and electro-physiological evidence for the 
‘reversed’ priming effect obtained by Eimer and 
Schlaghecken (1998), adapted from Eimer (1999).  
 
 
Upper panel: Response times and error rates obtained in 
compatible, neutral, and incompatible trials. Responses 
were slower and less accurate on compatible compared to 
neutral or incompatible trials.  
 
 
Lower panel: LRP waveforms obtained in compatible, 
neutral, and incompatible trials. Downward-going 
(positive) deflections indicate activation of the correct 
response (the response assigned to the target), whereas 
upward-going (negative) deflection indicate activation of 
the incorrect response. The black arrow indicates the time 
interval where the initial response activation was observed. 
The white arrow indicates the subsequent reversal of this 
effect. 
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'inhibition threshold' (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002). It was therefore concluded that 
unconscious processes of voluntary action control include both activation, as an 
early process, and – against formerly held beliefs and findings (e.g., McCormick, 
1997; Marcel, 1980; Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995) – inhibition, as a later, yet also 
unconscious control process (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2002, 2003). Enns and 
colleagues (Enns & Di Lollo, 1997; Llerras & Enns, 2004) presented an alternative 
explanation for the reversed compatibility effect (see Enns & Di Lollo, 2004 for a 
review). It will be discussed in the empirical part of the present work where it is 
relevant to the achieved results.  
 
The results from the above reported studies illustrate that voluntary actions are 
systematically affected by stimuli which are not available to conscious awareness 
with influences emerging both in facilitatory and inhibitory directions. Does this 
invoke the conclusion that conscious intentions are basically irrelevant for the 
control of action? Clearly not, as conclusions to be drawn from these studies are 
limited in an essential point: in forced–choice tasks, the prime–dependent response–
activation relies on a clear–cut and initially conscious S–R–mapping established by 
the task (Neumann, 1992; Prinz, 1998, 2000; Goschke, 2004). Thus, although the 
immediate trigger to each response was in fact external, physical and unconscious, 
the critical modulation occurred only with respect to the intentional S–R 
associations or ' intentional task set' acquired by instruction.  
 
To investigate whether unconscious stimuli would influence the selection of actions 
when there is no such instructive pre–specification researchers have applied 
subliminal priming in free–choice tasks.  
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2. 3. 3  Unconscious modulation of free–choice actions 
 
Both in common understanding and in philosophical terminology ‘voluntariness’ is 
closely related to the notion of 'free choice' between alternative possible actions. 
Some kind of selection process is required for actions to be considered as 'willed'. 
Typically, such choices are suggested to result from explicit, i.e., conscious 
contemplating and deciding. However, the idea that the antecedents to the 
voluntary choice of actions are necessarily conscious has been challenged by the 
results obtained in recent studies using free–choice tasks.  
 
One of the studies to reveal that action selections – albeit experienced as freely 
chosen by actors – were systematically influenced by preceding unconscious stimuli 
was conducted by Wendt–Kürschner (2006). Her experiment consisted of two phases 
(cf. Elsner & Hommel, 2001). In the initial acquisition–phase, participants learned to 
associate a left and a right key–press with one of two visual effect–stimuli: diamond 
and square. In the subsequent test–phase, participants were requested to freely 
choose whether to press the left or the right key whenever they received an arbitrary 
go–signal. Unbeknownst to participants, the former action–effects (square and 
diamond) were now displayed subliminally as 'effect–primes' before the 
presentation of the go–signal. The go–signal actually functioned as a backward–
mask for the subliminal effect–primes. The aim of the priming procedure was to 
activate an unconscious representation of the formerly learned action–effects such 
that this unconscious effect–anticipation would automatically co–activate the 
response which had been learned to produce this effect. The results were consistent 
with this prediction. Response–selections were systematically biased depending on 
the learned action–effect associations. Participants produced more selections which 
were consistent with the learned action–effect associations compared to selections 
which were inconsistent with the learned associations. Yet, they were unaware of 
this bias and experienced their responses as freely chosen. The author concluded 
that the masked effect–primes had in fact activated a representation of the learned 
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effect. Even though this effect–anticipation was not experienced consciously it 
increased the tendency to select the action which had been learned to produce the 
represented effect. This shows distinctly that voluntary action selection is controlled 
in terms of anticipated effects even when these effect anticipations remain 
unconscious (see also Kiesel, Wagener, Kunde, Hoffmann, Fallgatter & Stöcker, 
2005). 
 
An analogous but reversed selection bias for to–be–freely–chosen actions was 
observed under conditions of reversed priming. Using a task that was basically 
similar to the one used by Wendt–Kürschner (2006), Klapp and Hinkley (2002) 
found that under reversed priming conditions, participants more often selected the 
responses that were opposite rather than identical to previously learned action–
effect associations. Again, participants were unaware of this bias and had 
experienced their choices as 'free' (see also Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Klapp & 
Haas, 2005). Does this invoke that non–perceived stimuli control actions to be 
selected contrary to current intentions? According to Eimer & Schlaghecken (2004; 
also Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Klapp & Haas, 2005; but see Enns & Di Lollo, 2004; 
Llerras & Enns, 2004) the 'incompatible' priming effect' results from automatic self–
inhibitory mechanisms of motor control. Being purely motoric, the incompatible 
priming effect in free–choice would not indicate an unconscious 'polarity shift' of an 
intention, but indicate inhibited readiness to execute the prime–related response at 
the moment of target presentation resulting in a relative preference to select the 
opposite response. 
 
In conclusion, the results obtained in free–choice tasks further substantiate that even 
actions which are experienced as 'freely' chosen are not immune to non–consciously 
triggered biases. Importantly, however, unconscious modulation of behavior does 
not occur at random but depends on the preceding learning of action–effect 
relations. If there would have been no such prior learning phase, the masked primes 
should, again, not have had any systematic influence on participants’ selections (cf. 
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Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). In this respect, the results substantiate the idea that 
the voluntary selection of actions is controlled by learned representations of their 
associated effects (e.g. Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Elsner & 
Hommel, 2001; also Hommel, 1996) even when these effect–anticipations are not 
available to awareness (Wendt–Kürschner, 2006; Kiesel, Wagener, Kunde, 
Hoffmann, Fallgatter & Stöcker, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Klapp & 
Hinkley, 2002; Klapp & Haas, 2005). 
 
Taken together, the findings point towards a long–term indirect and often 
unconscious role of intention in the control of action. Recent conceptions of 
intentional action have therefore conceived of intentions as cognitive constraints 
which prepare the cognitive system of an actor, e.g., by augmenting the likelihood 
of selecting actions which are instrumental in realizing a current goal as soon as 
appropriate trigger stimuli are available (Goschke, 1996, 2002; Jordan, 2003; 
Hommel, 2000; Neumann & Prinz, 1987). According to this view, intentions are no 
longer considered as immediate causal triggers of voluntary actions. Rather, 
intentions are assumed to be functional in the control of actions by configuring the 
cognitive system according to an actor's basic beliefs, long–term goals, and current 
desires.  
 
Yet, if there is no 'conscious self' in our brain which triggers, causes, or controls our 
actions, why and how do we get to feel so convincingly as if there was one? Which 
mechanisms underlie the conscious feeling of voluntary control? The following 
chapter will consider recent approaches which argue that effect–anticipation is also 
essentially involved in generating the experience of agency.  
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2. 4 The experience of voluntary control  
 
In line with Albert Michotte (1954/1963, p.10) who identified “…our ability to 
foresee the result before it actually takes place…” as the main source of the 
experience of agency, current approaches on voluntary action and experienced 
control are based on the hypothesis that effect–anticipation is central not only to 
planning and selecting voluntary actions (see previous chapter) but also to the 
experience of authorship and control (e.g., Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004; Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000, 2002). More specifically, it is assumed that if a sensory 
action effect is accurately anticipated before the action individuals tend to 
experience the effect as self–caused. In contrast, in the case of mismatch between 
anticipated and actual effect the effect will be attributed to an external cause rather 
than to the self (Frith, 2005; see Haggard, 2005 for a review).  
 
Why (or how) should predictions or anticipations of future action–effects produce a 
sense of agency and experienced control? One approach to answering this 
intriguing question has been proposed by Daniel Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004). His 
concept is based on the well–established idea that events, which are nearby in space 
and time are likely perceived as causally related (Hume, 1739/1888; Michotte, 
1954/1963; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). 
 
 
2. 4. 1  Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation 
 
As early as in 1739, David Hume remarked that the conscious experience of control 
and agency might rely on a causal inference. He assumed that the ‘constant union’ 
and ‘inference of the mind’ that establish causality in physical events give rise to 
perceive causality in ‘actions of the mind’. He recognized the experience of agency 
as "nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we 
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knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind" 
(Hume, 1739/1888, p. 399).  
 
Inspired by Hume's ideas, Daniel Wegner (2002) proposed that the experience of 
conscious will rests upon the perception of an alleged causal link between a 
previous thought about an action and the action (see Figure 5). Specifically, he 
assumed that the three conditions which facilitate the perception of authorship in 
action are priority, consistency, and exclusivity: an action is experienced as self–caused 
or “willed” when a thought occurs just prior to the action that is consistent with the 
action and when there are no salient alternative causes for the action4. Thus, for 
Wegner, the conscious experience of will is based on an inference that we caused an 
action because we accurately previewed it (Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). In this view, the experience of conscious will is supposed to be just 
as fallible as self–reports of mental processes in general (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 It is well documented that the degree to which people perceive causal relationships in general (e.g., 
among physical events) varies proportional to the extent to which the conditions of priority, 
consistency and exclusivity in the relation between potential cause and effect are met (e.g., Hume, 
1739, 1748; Michotte, 1954/1963; Kelley, 1972; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). 
Figure 5. Daniel Wegner’s model of 
apparent mental causation, adapted 
from Wegner (2003).  
 
Experience of will occurs based on the 
perception of an apparent causal path 
from one’s thought to action. The 
actual causal paths remain unavailable 
to consciousness. Thoughts and action 
are caused by unconscious mental 
processes. The experience of will arises 
of what is apparent. 
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In support of this idea, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) demonstrated that individuals 
can be led to experience illusory control over actions which in reality are not self–
caused. Participants in their study were instructed to select one of several small 
objects, e.g., a giraffe, a flower, or a hat, pictured on the computer screen by 
stopping a cursor which they moved together with another person. Unbeknownst to 
participants, this person was a confederate of the experimenter who actually steered 
the cursor and produced the stops accordingly. On each trial, participants received 
an auditory prime word which either did or did not denominate the next selected 
item on screen. The priming was administered at 1 second before, or at 30 seconds 
before, or at 30 seconds after the corresponding stop. After each stop, participants 
were asked to rate whether they or their (alleged) co–player had caused the stop. 
The results showed that participants' ratings of control over the stops were higher 
for trials in which the prime word had activated a correct preview of the subsequent 
action effect immediately, i.e., at 1 s before the stop compared to when a temporally 
distant or no correct preview had been primed. Thus, inducing a thought about a 
potential action effect enhanced experienced authorship over the effect although the 
effect was in reality caused by someone else (see also Wegner, Sparrow, & 
Winerman, 2004).  
 
Critical aspects of Wegner’s approach 
 
Wegner's theory of apparent mental causation has been controversially discussed in 
several respects. The series of commentaries to Wegner’s target article in Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences provide an elaborate insight to this discussion (Wegner, 2004). 
The present chapter gives only a selective idea of this debate.  
 
A critical issue refers to the question of whether conscious will is an illusion (e.g., 
Nahmias, 2005; also commentaries in Wegner, 2004). As it will be discussed in detail 
in the general discussion of the empirical results of this work (chapter 4.4), the 
answer depends crucially on what is understood by the term illusion in this context 
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(see also Goschke & Walter, 2005; Linser & Goschke, 2006). With respect to the 
findings of the present work as well as earlier related findings it will be argued 
against a naïve “Cartesian” view. Thus, in line with Wegner it will be argued that 
empirical evidence available to date (including the data of the present work) 
contradicts the intuitive idea that the experience of agency and voluntary control 
rests on a privileged and incorrigible introspective access to the causal antecedents 
of one's actions and their effects. Albeit one may indeed regard experienced agency 
and voluntary control as an “illusion” in the sense „that the experience of consciously 
willing an action is not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action” 
(Wegner, 2002, p. 2) the fallibility of conscious will does not entail that the conscious 
experience of voluntary control is an illusion in the sense that it constantly deludes 
us about the causes of our actions and their effects (Goschke & Walter, 2005; Linser 
& Goschke, 2006). It does not follow from the occurrence of perceptual illusions that 
perception is always deluding us. In the same sense the observation that the 
experience of conscious will sometimes elicits the erroneous impression that we have 
controlled an effect which in reality was controlled externally does not imply that 
conscious will constantly deludes us about whether we are the originators of the 
events which follow our actions (cf. Goschke & Walter, 2005; Linser & Goschke, 
2006; Nahmias, 2005). 
 
Another controversial issue refers to the question of whether the processes involved 
in the generation of the experience of control are separate from or directly related to 
the processes involved in the control of action. Wegner’s illustration of 'apparent 
mental causation' suggests separate processes. As can be seen in Figure 5, the 
illustration of his concept includes ‘unconscious mental processes’ which generate 
both ‘action’ and ‘thoughts about the action’. There are no ‘actual causal path 
arrows’ leading from the ‘thought box’ to the ‘action’-box. This suggests that 
Wegner assumes no link between the processes underlying action production and 
conscious will. More explicitly, Wegner argues that the 'authorship–processing 
system' is a distinct module from the action control system which "…stands outside 
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the processes that cause the action itself, laboring in parallel with it ….", "…rumbles 
alongside the main machine", and "…is only loosely coupled to the action 
production system, a kind of observer of the system…" (Wegner, 2004, pp. 682, 683; 
italics in original). However, recent neurobiological findings strongly suggest that 
the processes involved in the production of action and those underlying the 
generation of experienced control interact closely (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 
2000; Haggard, 2005; Koch, 2004). In this respect, Wegner has been criticized to omit 
relevant neurobiological findings (e.g., Nahmias, 2005).  
One theory of voluntary action that focuses more specifically on the neurobiological 
mechanisms involved in the generation of experienced agency and the control of 
action has been proposed by Chris Frith and his colleagues. It is closely tied to the 
internal model theory – an approach to explain motor control (e.g., Wolpert, 1997). 
Together with relevant neuropsychological findings, it will be addressed in the 
following chapter. 
 
 
2. 4. 2 The Internal forward model theory and the sensory 
attenuation hypothesis 
 
Current research on motor control has shown that the execution of controlled action 
relies on predictions of movements and their perceptual consequences made by 
internal forward models – neural representations of own body movements in their 
relation to the external environment (e.g., Miall, Weir, Wolpert, & Stein, 1993; 
Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995; Miall & Wolpert, 1996). It is argued that such 
predictions also help to distinguish whether actions and their consequences are self- 
or externally produced (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000; Frith, 2005). Two 
types of prediction are made (see Figure 6).  First, a forward dynamic model predicts 
the spatio-temporal coordinates of a movement. By comparing the predicted with 
the intended movement trajectory it enables the system to rapidly adjust motor 
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commands in order to perform an action as intended. The forward dynamic model 
is thus directly involved in action production and learning (Blakemore, 2003; see 
also Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). The second type of prediction, forward 
output model, predicts the sensory consequences that will result from a movement 
based on the efference-copy of a respective movement. As soon as a movement is 
completed the predicted consequences are compared with the perceptual effects that 
actually follow the movement based on afference–copies. This comparison serves to 
distinguish self– from externally caused action. If the prediction was correct, i.e., 
predicted and actual action effects coincide, the sensory representation of the effect 
is attenuated which signals the effect is to be experienced as self–generated (Frith, 
2005; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000). In contrast, if no or an incorrect 
prediction is computed such that predicted and actual effect diverge which should 
occur in particular for externally produced movements, there will be no or a less 
pronounced attenuation of the sensory effect representation and an increased 
tendency to ascribe the effect to an external cause (Frith, 2005; Blakemore, Wolpert, 
& Frith, 1998, 2000). The effect-prediction of the forward output model and its 
comparison with the actually observed sensory consequence of action is thus 
supposed to be directly involved in the generation of experienced control in 
voluntary action. 
 
In support of the idea that the correspondence between an action and its perceptual 
effect modulates the degree of perceptual intensity Blakemore, Frith and Wolpert 
(1999) asked participants to rate the intensity (degree of 'ticklishness') of a tactile 
stimulation applied to their hand via a robotic interface. The robot was either 
externally controlled by the experimenter or self–controlled by participants via 
remote. Results revealed that, even though the actual intensity of the stimulation 
was identical in all conditions, intensity ratings were higher when the tickling was 
externally produced, i.e., not precisely predicted by forward model, compared to 
when the stimulation was self–generated. Moreover, in the self–caused condition, 
different degrees of spatiotemporal deviation between participants’ initiation of the 
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robot–movement, i.e., the resulting tactile stimulation, were introduced. Even 
though participants did not notice the deviation intensity ratings varied 
proportional to its degree. The higher the spatiotemporal discrepancy between the 
movement and the subsequent stimulation, the more intense the 'tickling' was 
experienced. This is consistent with the idea that perceived intensity of sensory 
action effects is attenuated when the effects are correctly compared to when they are 
incorrectly or unpredicted. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was 
found to reflect the behavioural data. Self–produced sensory stimuli produce less 
activation in somatosensory cortex and anterior cingulate cortex compared to the 
same stimuli when they were externally produced (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 
1998). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Action prediction and experienced control based on a forward model of motor control, 
adapted from Blakemore (2003). A forward dynamic model predicts consequences of motor 
commands. The forward output model predicts the perceptual effects of motor commands. 
This prediction is then compared with the actual consequences of movement. If this comparison 
leads to a detection of a match between the predicted perceptual consequences and the 
actual sensory representation which results from the perception of the effect following 
action the sensory representation will be attenuated and the effect will be experienced as 
self-caused. In case a mismatch is detected there will be no sensory attenuation and the 
effect will be experienced as externally controlled. 
 
 
Further evidence that the experience of agency depends on the congruence between 
anticipated and actual sensory effects of an action was recently reported by Sato and 
Forward 
Dynamic 
Model 
Perceptual 
System 
Action -
Production 
System 
Forward 
Output 
Model 
Efference 
Copy 
Motor 
Command
Match Æ  
sensory  attenuation 
Mismatch Æ 
No sensory 
Comparator 
Predicted Sensory Feedback  
 
Actual Perceptual  Feedback  
 Chapter 2:  Theoretical Background                                                                                  43 ___________________________________________________________________________
  
Yasuda (2005). In their experiments, participants first learned that pressing a left or 
a right key was consistently followed after a constant delay either by a high or a low 
tone (the action effect). In a subsequent test phase the responses were either 
followed by the same tone as in the prior learning phase (congruent trials), or they 
were followed by the other, i.e., unexpected tone (incongruent trials). Participants 
were instructed that the tones could be the result of their own action or the 
experimenter’s action. The results showed that the self-reported degree to which 
participants felt that the tone was a consequence of their own action diminished 
when the effect tones were inconsistent with the learned action-effect mapping. 
Moreover, the sense of agency was reduced when the tone was presented at an 
unexpected delay, although in fact it was self-produced. In line with the forward 
model theory, these findings support the idea that the execution of an action is 
accompanied by the generation of a prediction of the sensory consequences of the 
action, which is then compared with the actual consequences of the action 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000; Frith, 2005). The higher the congruence 
between anticipated and actual action-effects, the stronger is the tendency to 
experience the effect as caused by one’s own action. 
 
The internal forward model theory also helps to understand certain psychiatric and 
neurological disorders which include dysfunctions in the awareness of action such 
as for instance schizophrenia. Schizophrenic patients often report passivity 
experiences. These so called 'delusions of alien control' are characterized by the 
feeling that one's action, speech and thoughts are controlled by another person or 
'outer force' (e.g., Frith, 1987, 1992, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a,b). In 
terms of the internal forward model approach, such delusive control experiences are 
supposed to reflect a dysfunction in forward output model that normally predicts the 
perceptual effects of self–generated actions (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; 
Frith, 2005). It is suggested that, because of the dysfunction, the prediction of the 
behavioral outcome is inaccurate or missing even when actions are self-produced. 
As a consequence the sensory representation of the action–effects will not be 
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attenuated such that –erroneously– behavior and its effects will be experienced as 
alien-controlled (Blakemore, 2003; Frith, 2005). Correspondingly, it was found that 
schizophrenic patients who reported delusions of alien control experienced both 
self– and externally caused stimulations as equally intense whilst healthy controls 
who correctly differentiated self- and externally produced action-effects judged the 
self–produced stimulations as less intense compared to the identical but externally 
administered stimulations (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 2000; see 
also Daprati, Franck, Georgieff, Proust, Pacherie, Dalery, & Jeannerod, 1997). 
 
Thus, accurate predictions of action–effect and their match with the perceived 
outcome are central to adaptive control– and authorship experiences. Conversely, 
any dysfunction in the ability to form correct predictions of future action–effects 
leads to severely disturbing experiences concerning authorship and control of action 
such as they are reported for instance by schizophrenic patients suffering from 
delusions of alien control. 
 
In summary, two recent theories of willed action were discussed which argue that 
anticipations of action–effects play a key–role in generating the experience of 
voluntary control. According to the theory of apparent mental causation proposed 
by Wegner conscious will relies on the perception of an alleged causal relationship 
between one's action and a subsequent perceptual event (action–effect) which is 
inferred when the action–effect has been consistently previewed (Wegner, 2002, 
2003, 2004). In terms of the internal forward model concept by Frith and colleagues, 
body–movements and their sensory effects are experienced as self–caused when an 
internal forward output model has correctly predicted the effect such that the 
sensory representation of the effect is attenuated (Frith, 2005; Blakemore, 2003; 
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000, 2002). Both conceptions and the empirical 
findings related to them converge in at least two central aspects. Firstly, they agree 
that accurate anticipations of sensory action effects are of crucial significance to 
experienced control. Secondly, they explain that experienced control does not 
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necessarily reflect objective control conditions provided in a current situation in 
healthy participants (e.g., Wegner & Wheateley, 1999) and in patients with 
schizophrenia (e.g., Frith, 1992; 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a,b; 
Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). 
 
An important aspect that remains to be clarified concerns the question which 
processes involved in generating experienced control are themselves necessarily 
available to consciousness (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002).  The significance of 
this issue becomes obvious when we consider of voluntary action in everyday life, 
where we do not constantly anticipate our intended goals or monitor the chosen 
action-process to achieve them.  
 
The question of whether effect-anticipations are necessarily conscious or whether 
they affect the generation of experienced agency even when they are themselves 
unavailable to awareness was the aim of the empirical studies conducted in the 
present work. Important inspiration for this aim was provided by the empirical 
findings discussed in the previous chapters which revealed that the control of 
voluntary action is systematically affected by unconscious anticipations of action 
effects (e.g., Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2001; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Wendt-Kürschner, 2006). 
 
 
2. 5 Aim of the current work 
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine whether unconscious effect-anticipations 
systematically affect the experience of voluntary control. Precisely it was 
hypothesized that (1) if a sensory action effect is accurately anticipated before the 
action individuals tend to experience the effect as self-caused, whereas in case of a 
mismatch between anticipated and actual effect the effect will be attributed to an 
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external cause rather than to the self (Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Frith, 2005; Blakemore, 
Wolpert & Frith, 2002). (2) It was assumed that such effect–anticipations 
systematically affect the degree of experienced control even when they remain 
completely unavailable to an actor's conscious awareness (e.g., Neumann & Klotz, 
1994; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001).  
 
To investigate these assumptions four experiments were conducted. The purpose of 
the experimental design was twofold. (1) It was investigated whether the degree to 
which participants experienced to be in control over a perceptual event which 
followed their action as an alleged effect was systematically modulated by priming a 
representation of this “effect”, even when the was in reality not systematically related 
to the preceding action and thus not controllable by the participant. (2) It was 
examined whether this modulation of experienced control occurred even when the 
effect-anticipations were induced by masked “effect”-primes which remained 
unconscious. In other words it was hypothesized to induce an illusion of control by 
priming an unconscious “effect”–anticipation.  
 
For that purpose a control-judgment task was designed in which on each trial 
participants performed one of two actions which were followed by one of two 
visual stimuli. By pressing keys participants either had limited control (Experiment 1) 
or no control at all (Exp. 2, 3, and 4) over which stimulus appeared on a given trial. 
Immediately before each action a masked prime-stimulus was presented which was 
either congruent or incongruent with the post-action stimulus. Each experiment 
included an additional methodological control experiment to assess that the primes 
remained fully unconscious according to a strict forced-choice recognition criterion. 
The following chapter will describe these experiments and report and discuss the 
obtained results.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Experimental Part 
 
 
3. 1   Introduction 
 
In the present chapter, 4 Experiments will be reported. With respect to the questions 
discussed in the previous chapter the purpose of these experiments was twofold. 
First, it was attempted to investigate whether an illusion of conscious control over an –
objectively uncontrollable– event that follows one's action can be induced by 
priming a representation of this event prior to the action. Secondly, it was examined 
whether such a modulation of conscious control occurs even when the primed 
representation of the event remains completely unconscious according to an 
objective forced-choice criterion (e.g., Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; Eimer 
Schlaghecken, 2003). 
 
To this end a control–judgment task was designed in which on each trial participants 
performed one of two actions followed by one of two visual stimuli. By pressing 
keys participants either had limited (Experiment 1) or no control at all (Experiments 
2–4) over which stimulus appeared on a given trial. Immediately before each action 
a masked prime was presented.  This prime was either congruent or incongruent 
with the post–action effect-stimulus. The main prediction was that subliminally 
priming the representation of the post-action stimulus before each action would 
lead participants to overestimate the degree of control they had over the stimuli 
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compared to when no or even an incongruent stimulus representation was primed. 
The critical idea underlying this prediction is that the mechanism that normally 
computes internal predictions of action effects may be “tricked” when an external 
prime activates an “effect”-representation immediately prior to a voluntary action, 
especially when in reality the actual effects are unpredictable. If this prediction 
turns out to be correct it would constitute strong evidence that the conscious 
experience of agency depends on the congruency between an (unconsciously 
activated) effect representation and the actual “effect” following the action. In 
Experiment 1 this prediction was tested in a forced-choice task. In Experiments 2 – 4 
participants were free to choose on each trial which action they performed. 
 
 
Apparatus 
 
In all experiments participants were seated 60 cm from a 17 inch monitor which had 
a refresh–rate of 75 Hz. Stimulus presentation and response recording were 
controlled by a Personal Computer and synchronized with the vertical retrace signal 
of the monitor. All experiments were programmed and run by “Colapse”-Software 
which is a non-commercial stimulus-presentation program designed by Goschke 
(unpublished).  
 
 
Statistical analyses 
 
Repeated measures Analyses Of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted to assess 
whether the 3 levels of the within-subject factor of prime-effect-congruity (congruent, 
neutral, and incongruent) had a significant main effect on the mean degrees of 
participants' control-judgments. The procedure of ANOVA tests differences 
between group mean values (in the present case the difference between the mean 
control judgments in the three conditions of prime-effect-congruity as a within 
group factor) for significance by an F-test based on the Fischer-distribution. After 
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ANOVA's F-test yielded a significant main effect of the factor of prime effect 
congruity on the degree of judged control, two tailed paired t-tests were used to 
compute planned single contrast comparisons between the control-judgment-means 
in the congruity conditions. The t-test tests for differences between group means 
based on the t-distribution. The same statistical procedures were used to analyze 
data of the methodological forced-choice response priming task. In the prime-
identification task participants' identification performance (mean percentual 
amount of correctly identified primes) was tested against the chance level value of 
identification performance by a one sample t-test.  
 
Statistical parameters of these procedures are reported by using the following 
abbreviations: F(dffactor levels, dfresidual) for ANOVA's F-test parameter and its degrees 
of freedom (dffactor levels = number of factor levels minus 1; dfresidual = number of 
participants minus 1 by number of factor levels minus 1); t(n-1) t-test parameter for 
n (number of data) -1 degrees of freedom; p  for probability of null hypothesis, i.e., 
the significance level of the result; SD for Standard Deviation; MSE for Mean 
Squared Error. All statistical data analyses were performed using SPSS 11.5. 
 
 
 
3.2 Experiment 1 - Unconscious modulation of experienced 
control in   forced-choice action 
 
 
Experiment 1 investigated whether masked priming of effect–stimuli which 
followed participants’ actions as potential action–effects systematically affects the 
degree to which participants experienced to be in control over stimuli which 
followed their actions as potential effects. In reality participants had only a limited 
degree of control over these stimuli. To examine whether the presumed modulation 
of the conscious control experience by the effect–primes occurs on an unconscious 
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level the effect–primes were presented very briefly and masked such that they were 
not consciously perceived.  
 
 
3. 2. 1  Methods 
 
 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduates (24 female, 27 right–handed) from the Dresden University of 
Technology, aged 19–34 years (mean 23.4 years) participated for € 4 or course credit. 
All had normal or corrected to normal vision and were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment within the limits of informed consent. 
 
 
Control–judgment task 
Stimuli and procedure. Each trial began with the presentation of a forward–mask 
which was followed by a prime and a backward–mask. The forward mask was 
presented for 150 milliseconds (ms), the prime for 30 ms, and the backward mask 
for 17 ms. After the backward-mask, one of two imperative target–stimuli appeared 
for 50 ms and was replaced by a blank screen remaining visible until a response was 
made. Primes consisted of left– or right–pointing arrows (<<<< or >>>>) which 
were 0.4 cm in height and 3 cm in width. The mask was composed of left– and 
right–pointing arrows superimposed on each other sized 0.8 cm x 4.5 cm. The same 
shape was also used as a neutral prime. Targets consisted of a diamond (#) sized 0.5 
cm x 0.8 cm or a cross (+) sized 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm. Participants were instructed to press 
with their index and middle fingers of their dominant hand one of two keys which 
were vertically arranged on the keyboard to indicate which of the two imperative 
target stimuli, i.e., “#” or “+”, had appeared on the screen. Stimulus–response 
mapping was counterbalanced across participants. Immediately after the response 
either left– or right–pointing arrows appeared for 500 ms as alleged effects of the 
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key–press. Key to effect–stimulus assignment was counterbalanced across 
participants. After a delay of 1 second (s) the next trial started. All stimuli were 
presented in black on a grey background. Participants were asked to try to find out 
whether by pressing the one or other key they could control which of the two effect–
stimuli occurred. Figure 7 shows stimuli, series and durations of events of 
Experiment 1. 
 
Design. The contingency between participants' key presses and the alleged effects 
was imperfect: in 75% of trials a particular effect–stimulus appeared when a 
particular imperative stimulus had been presented; in the remaining 25% of trials 
the other effect–stimulus appeared. Stimuli–assignment to probabilities was 
counterbalanced across participants. Thus if a participant always pressed the correct 
key there was a limited contingency between key–presses and effect–stimuli such 
that each of the two key–presses was followed by one particular effect–stimulus in 
75% of trials and participants had limited control over whether left or right pointing 
arrows appeared. The critical independent variable was the relationship between 
the prime and the post–action effect–stimulus. As can be seen in Figure 7, this 
relation was either congruent, e.g., a left–pointing effect-arrow following a left–
pointing arrow prime, incongruent, e.g., a left–pointing effect-arrow following a 
right–pointing arrow prime, or neutral, e.g., a left–pointing arrow effect following 
the neutral prime. The three prime–effect relations were realized in separate blocks 
each consisting of 40 trials. Each participant performed two blocks with only 
congruent, two with only incongruent and two with only neutral prime–effect pairs. 
Order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Figure 7. Experimental setup of the control–judgment task in Experiment 1. Exemplary sequence 
and duration of events on a trial for the three conditions of prime–effect–congruity 
(congruent, incongruent and neutral). 
 
 
 
Dependent variable and predictions. After each block participants received a 
questionnaire to rate how much control they thought they had had over whether the 
arrows were pointing to the left or right on a rating scale ranging from 0% for “no 
control” to 100% for “complete control” (cf. Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Control 
judgments were expected to be systematically modulated by prime–effect congruity: 
they were predicted to be higher on congruent than on neutral trials and higher on 
neutral than on incongruent trials. The control scale is shown in Figure 8. 
Participants originally received the questionnaire in German (see Appendix A1).   
 
 
Please estimate the extent to which you think you could control (by pressing the blue or the 
red button) whether the arrows appearing on screen were pointing to the left or right! 
 
By pressing keys I had ..... 
          
          
   0%                   50%                100% 
 no control                                                   medium control                                       full control 
 
                      ......over whether the arrows were pointing to the left or right. 
 
 
Figure 8. Control judgment scale used in Experiment 1. The original version in German can be seen 
in Appendix A1. 
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Prime–impact: forced–choice priming task  
To assess whether the masked primes had in fact activated the representation of 
their shapes a forced-choice priming task was accomplished. 
 
Stimuli and procedure. As Figure 9 shows stimuli, series and durations of events were 
the same as in the control–judgment task except that now the stimuli that were used 
as imperative stimuli (“+”, “#”) in the control–judgment task were replaced by the 
former effect–stimuli (left– and right–pointing arrows). No further effect–stimuli 
appeared after the key–presses. On each trial the forward mask (150 ms) was 
followed by a prime (30 ms), the backward mask (17 ms) and a target (50 ms) which 
was replaced by a blank screen that remained visible until a response was made. 
Participants were instructed to press with the index– and middle–fingers of their 
dominant hand as fast and accurately as possible one of two vertically arranged 
keys to indicate whether the target–arrows were pointing to the left or right. Key–
target mapping was counterbalanced across participants. The intertrial interval (ITI) 
was 1 s. 
 
Design and prediction. Prime–target pairs were congruent, incongruent or neutral. 
After 18 practice trials 60 congruent, 60 incongruent, and 60 neutral trials were 
presented in random order. Responses were expected to be faster and more accurate 
after congruent compared to neutral or incongruent trials (cf. Neumann & Klotz, 
1994). 
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Figure 9. Experimental setup of the forced-choice priming task in Experiment 1. Exemplary 
sequence and duration of events on a trial for the three conditions of prime–effect–congruity 
(congruent, incongruent and neutral). 
 
 
Prime–perceptibility  
After the control–judgment task participants’ awareness of the primes was 
determined both with respect to a subjective and an objective criterion (Merikle, 
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001).  
 
Awareness questionnaire. Participants were asked on a questionnaire whether at any 
point they had seen anything on the monitor except for the mask and the effect–
stimuli and if so, what they had seen. This was the subjective criterion of prime 
awareness. The questionnaire can be seen in Appendix B 1. 
 
Prime–identification task. After participants had completed the awareness 
questionnaire, they were informed about the presence of primes. Then they were 
instructed to perform a forced–choice prime–identification task to assess prime 
visibility also according to an objective awareness–criterion. As shown in Figure 10, 
materials were the same as in the response–priming task except that targets were 
now substituted by a question mark in black font sized 0.8 cm x 0.4 cm. Each trial 
commenced with the forward mask (150 ms) which was followed by a prime (30 
ms), the backward mask (17 ms) and the question mark (50 ms) which was replaced 
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by a blank screen remaining visible until a response was made. On 80 trials, i.e., 40 
trials each prime  because the neutral prime was omitted, participants indicated 
whether the prime consisted of left– or right–pointing arrows by pressing one of 
two vertically arranged keys on the computer keyboard. Primes were presented in 
random order. The predicted rate of correctly identified primes was at the chance 
level of 50%. 
 
Figure 10. Experimental setup of the prime-identification task in Experiment 1. Exemplary 
sequence of events on a trial. 
 
 
 
3. 2. 2 Data analyses and results 
 
Prime–identification. Two participants who declared identification of the masked 
primes were excluded from all further analyses. In the prime–identification task 
remaining participants’ mean rate of correctly identified primes was 50.83%. A t-test 
revealed that this was not significantly different from 50% chance, p > .1.  
 
Control–judgments. Mean control–judgments were computed for each of the 6 blocks 
of the control–judgment task and then collapsed over the two blocks of each 
condition of prime–effect congruity. The degree of experienced control was clearly 
modulated by the masked primes: A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a highly 
significant effect of prime-effect congruity [F(2, 54) = 7.76, p < .002]. This reflects that 
control was judged higher after blocks with congruent compared to incongruent or 
Time 
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neutral prime-effect pairs. A pair-tailed t-test for dependent samples showed that 
control-judgments were reliably higher on congruent than on incongruent trials, 
[t(27) = 2.74, p < .02,  SD = 10.97]. This effect could not be attributed to differences in 
participants’ responses in the different conditions because mean RT [M= 668 ms; SD 
= 148.47] and mean error rate [M = 4.5%, SD = 5.06] did not significantly differ 
between congruity conditions. On a descriptive level control-ratings were lower on 
neutral compared to incongruent trials. However, this difference was not significant 
[p > .2]. The results of the control judgments are shown in Figure 11, left panel. 
 
Forced–choice priming. Incorrect responses [overall mean error rate = 2.95%, SD = 
2.61] and responses exceeding 1500 ms [overall mean RT = 450 ms, SD = 62.74] were 
excluded. Mean RTs of the remaining responses were computed for each of the 
three conditions of prime–target congruity. As shown in Figure 11 (right panel), 
responses were faster on congruent than on neutral or incongruent trials. This 
indicates that the masked primes had in fact activated an unconscious 
representation of their shape. A repeated measures ANOVA yielded a significant 
main effect of congruity [F(2, 54) = 34.80, p <  .001, MSE = 241.87]. A pair-tailed t-test 
revealed that responses were significantly faster on congruent than neutral trials 
[t(27) = –4.52, p < .001, SD = 23.56] and faster on neutral than on incongruent trials 
[t(27) = 3.53, p < .002, SD = 21.66]. The analogous ANOVA on error rates designated 
a main effect of congruity [F(2, 54) = 3.60, p <  .04, MSE = 6.63]. A two-tailed paired 
t-test comparison confirmed that participants committed significantly less errors on 
congruent than on incongruent trials [t(27) = –2.44, p < .03, SD = 3.99]. 
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Figure 11. Results of Experiment 1. Left panel: Mean control–judgments in the control–judgment 
task as a function of prime–effect congruity. Right panel: Mean RTs in the forced–choice 
priming task as a function of prime–target congruity. Error bars show 95% within–
participants confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
 
 
3. 2. 3 Discussion 
 
In Experiment 1, subliminal priming of the representation of an alleged effect 
stimulus immediately prior to a voluntary action influenced the degree to which 
participants’ experienced control over sensory events which appeared after their 
actions as potential action–effects. The extent of experienced control was 
significantly increased when the alleged effect–stimuli were congruently primed 
before each action compared to when an incongruent or a neutral effect–prime had 
been presented.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the experience 
of conscious control emerges from an unconscious comparison between anticipated 
and actual sensory consequences of an action. If this comparison yields a match, 
control is more likely to be attributed to the self rather than to an external cause, 
whereas in the case of a mismatch between anticipated and actual action effect 
control is ascribed to an external cause rather than to the self. 
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3.3 Experiment 2 - Unconscious modulation of experienced 
control in   free-choice action 
 
Experiment 2 attempted to substantiate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 in 
three ways. (1) It was examined whether masked priming of alleged effect–stimuli 
varies the degree of experienced control over these stimuli even when actions are 
freely chosen by the participants. Therefore, the control judgment task of Experiment 
1 was modified such that participants now freely chose whether to press a left or a 
right key–press whenever they received an unspecific go–signal. (2) It was 
investigated whether the prime–induced modulation of conscious control occurs 
even when there is absolutely no systematic correlation between these actions and 
stimuli appearing subsequently as alleged action–effects. (3) It was addressed 
whether anticipatory priming of an unconscious effect–representation affects 
experienced control also on a more abstract conceptual level of processing. Hence, 
in Experiment 2 semantic stimuli (color words) were used to prime unconscious 
representations of post–action "effect"–stimuli (colored circles), (Dehaene, Naccache, 
LeClec'H, Koechlin, Mueller, Dehaene–Lambertz, van de Moortele, & LeBihan, 1998, 
2001; Fairhall, Hamm, & Kirk, 2006; Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000). As in Experiment 1, 
participants first performed six blocks of the –modified– control-judgment task and 
two subsequent methodological control experiments, i.e., the forced-choice priming 
task and the prime-identification task.  
 
 
3. 3. 1 Methods 
 
Participants  
Sixty–seven undergraduates (43 female, 67 right–handed) from the Technical 
University of Dresden participated for partial fulfillment of course credit or € 4 after 
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having given their written informed approval. They were on average 22 years old 
(range 19–35), had normal or corrected–to–normal vision and were naïve to the 
purpose of the experiment. 
 
Control judgment task 
Stimuli. Primes consisted of the words BLUE (German: BLAU), YELLOW (German: 
GELB), and the non–word AGLB (used as a neutral prime) all of which were 0.6 cm 
in height and 2 cm in width. The mask was a letter string “ORTFX” sized 0.8 cm x 3 
cm. The go–signal was a "click"–tone of 300 Hz presented over head–phones. The 
effect–stimuli consisted of a blue and a yellow circle which extended 2.5 cm in 
diameter. Except for the two color circles all visual stimuli were presented in black 
font. The background of the computer screen was white. Stimuli are seen in Figure 
12. 
 
Procedure. Each trial began with the presentation of a prime which was replaced by 
the mask appearing simultaneously with the auditory go–signal. The prime was 
shown for 50 ms5 and the mask remained visible for 100 ms. The mask was followed 
by a blank screen that remained until a response was made. Participants were 
instructed to freely choose to press either the left or the right out of two indicated 
buttons on the computer–keyboard as soon as they had received the go–signal. They 
were asked to press both of the keys approximately equally often while avoiding 
systematic alternations or runs. Immediately after the response either a blue or a 
yellow circle appeared and remained on the screen for 2 s as the alleged “effect” of 
the key–presses. Participants were asked to try to find out by pressing the left or the 
right key whether they could control which of the two colored circles appeared.  
 
                                                 
5 At first glance, the prime presentation duration of 50 ms may appear unusually long, in particular 
with respect to previous studies using much shorter durations for masked primes (e.g., Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 1998; Neumann & Klotz, 1994). However, meticulous pilot studies which tested the 
present stimulus materials in forced choice priming tasks yielded no priming effect, i.e., no differences 
in response times, for shorter prime durations. 50 ms prime-duration was found to yield reliable 
priming effects and a satisfying extent of non-perceptibility.  
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Design. Actually there was no correlation between participants´ freely chosen key–
presses and the colors of the circles. Instead one of the colors appeared with a 
probability of 75% while the other appeared with a probability of 25%, irrespective of 
which key was pressed. Color–assignment to probabilities was counterbalanced 
across participants. Thus participants had no control over which colored circle 
appeared. The critical independent variable was the systematic relation between the 
color of the circle and the meaning of the prime word which was either congruent, 
e.g., a blue circle following the prime word “BLUE”, incongruent, e.g., a blue circle 
following the prime word “YELLOW”, or neutral, e.g., a blue circle following the 
nonword–prime “AGLB”. The three conditions of prime–effect congruity were 
realized in separate blocks by 40 trials. Each participant performed two blocks with 
only congruent, two with only incongruent, and two with only neutral prime–effect 
pairs. Order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
 
Figure 12. Experimental setup of the control judgment task in Experiment 2. Sequence and 
durations of events in a trial for the three conditions of prime–“effect”–congruity. Blue-
colored circles are printed in black, yellow-colored circles in grey ink. 
 
 
Dependent variable and prediction. After each block participants rated how much 
control they thought they had had over whether a blue or a yellow appeared after 
their key–presses (the control judgment questionnaire can be seen in Appendix A 2). 
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As in Experiment 1 control–judgments were expected to be higher for congruent 
compared to incongruent or neutral prime–effect pairs even though there was no 
systematic correlation between participants’ key-presses and the circle colors.  
 
Prime–impact: forced–choice priming task 
Stimuli and procedure. After the control-judgment task, it was assessed whether the 
masked primes did in fact activate the representation of their meaning in a forced-
choice priming task (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; Heil, Rolke, & Pecchinenda, 
2004; Marcel, 1983). Materials and durations of events were the same as in the 
control-judgment task except that the circles shown as “effects” in the control 
judgment task were now used as imperative target stimuli. Trials started with a 
prime (50 ms) which was followed by the mask (100 ms) and a target, i.e., one of the 
two color-circles, remaining visible until a response was given. No further stimuli 
appeared after the response. The ITI was 1 s. Participants were instructed to press as 
fast and as accurate as possible a left or a right key to indicate whether the target-
circle was blue or yellow. Key–target mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
 
Design and prediction. Prime–target pairs were congruent, incongruent, or neutral. 
After 18 practice trials, 20 congruent, 20 incongruent, and 20 neutral trials were 
presented in random order. Participants were expected to respond faster and more 
accurately on congruent than on neutral trials and faster and more accurately on 
neutral than on incongruent trials. 
 
Prime–perceptibility 
Awareness questionnaire and prime–identification task. After having completed the 
priming task, participants received the questionnaire to indicate whether at any 
point they had seen any object on the screen apart from the mask, the targets and 
the effect–stimuli and if so, what they had seen (see Appendix B 2.). In the prime–
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identification task materials were the same as in the response–priming task except 
that target stimuli were now omitted. The prime–identification task comprised 33 
trials such that each of the three prime–stimuli was delivered on 11 trials. Order of 
prime–presentation was randomized. Each trial began with the presentation of a 
prime (50 ms) which was followed by the mask (100 ms) and a blank screen 
remaining visible until participants had pressed the left–, the right–, or the space–
key to indicate the identity of the preceding prime–stimulus. Given that now three 
primes were at disposal the predicted rate of correctly identified primes was 33%.  
 
 
3. 3. 2   Data analyses and results 
 
Prime identification. In the awareness–questionnaire 17 participants declared 
identification of the prime–words. In the identification task participants identified 
on average 49% of the primes correctly.  This was significantly above the 33%- 
chance level [t(66) = 5.37, p < .001, SD = 23.8]. Therefore participants were classified 
as aware (“detectors”) or unaware (“non–detectors”) depending on whether their 
performance was above or below the median rate (52%) of correctly identified 
primes. Detectors (N = 36) accurately recognized on average 63% of the masked 
primes which was significantly better than chance [t(35) = 8.9, p < .001, SD = 19.8]. 
Non–detectors (N = 30) identified on average 32% of the primes correctly which did 
not differ substantially from chance [t(29) = – .7, p > .4, SD = 14.8]. Data from one 
participant who reported conscious identification of the primes but paradoxically 
performed far below chance level in the prime-identification task were discarded. 
Control–judgments. For each participant mean control–judgments were computed for 
each of the 6 experimental blocks of the control–judgment task and then collapsed 
over the two blocks of each condition of prime–“effect” congruity. Both detectors 
and non–detectors gave higher control–judgments after blocks with congruent 
compared to neutral or incongruent prime–"effect" pairs. A mixed 3 by 2 ANOVA 
with the factors of “prime-effect congruity” and “prime-awareness” and 
Chapter 3:  Experimental Part                                                                                  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
63
“experienced control” as the dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of 
the factor “prime-effect congruity” [F(2, 128) = 3.34, p < .04, MSE = 105.8], but 
neither an effect of prime awareness [p > .10] nor an interaction of the two variables 
[p > .80]. On a descriptive level control judgments were somewhat lower for the 
detectors compared to non-detectors. This possibly reflects the fact that conscious 
perception of the primes led detectors to speculate about the purpose of the primes 
and to proceed more strategically in the experiment. Importantly, the modulating 
impact of the primes on experienced control, i.e., the difference between control-
judgments for congruent compared to incongruent trials, was of almost identical 
magnitude for detectors and non-detectors. This effect could not be attributed to 
differences in participants’ responses in the different conditions. Mean RT for 
detectors [M = 314.8 ms, SD 131.48] and non–detectors [M = 305.8 ms, SD 159.69} 
did not differ between the congruity conditions. Results of the control judgment 
task are shown in Figure 13, left panel. 
 
Forced–choice priming. Incorrect responses [overall mean error rate = 2.77%, SD = 
3.72] and responses exceeding a latency of 1500 ms [overall mean RT = 407.29 ms, 
SD = 50.66] were excluded. Mean RTs of the remaining responses were computed 
for each awareness–group and condition. As can be seen in Figure 13 (right panel), 
mean RT was lower on congruent than on neutral trials, and lower on neutral than 
on incongruent trials. A mixed 3 (prime-target-congruity) x 2 (prime–awareness) 
ANOVA yielded an effect of prime-target-congruity [F(2, 128) = 11.43, p <  .001, 
MSE = 252.87], but neither an effect of prime awareness [p > .5], nor an interaction of 
the two variables [p > .4]. An analogous ANOVA revealed that error rates did not 
differ significantly between congruity conditions [p > .5]. 
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Figure 13. Data of Experiment 2 for participants classified as 'non–detectors' and 'detectors'. Left 
panel: Mean control–judgments in the control–judgment task as a function of prime–
“effect” congruity. Right panel: Mean RTs in the forced–choice priming task as a function 
of prime–target congruity.  Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 
3. 3. 3   Discussion 
 
In conclusion, the pattern of results of Experiment 1 was almost perfectly replicated 
in Experiment 2 although participants now freely chose which action to perform 
and although there was no contingency between their actions and the alleged effect-
stimuli. The degree of experienced control was again substantially modulated by the 
masked primes. This effect was independent from whether participants were aware 
or unaware of the primes according to an objective forced-choice criterion.  
In summary, even though participants now performed freely chosen actions and 
had no control at all over the alleged “effect” stimuli they judged their control 
significantly higher after blocks with congruent compared to neutral or incongruent 
prime-“effect” pairs. That this effect occurred with semantic “effect”-primes (color 
words) reveals that the impact of masked effect-primes extends to a conceptual level 
of processing. 
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3.4 Experiment 3 – ‘Reversed’ unconscious modulation of 
experienced control 
 
In Experiment 3 it was attempted in to reverse the impact of masked "effect"–primes 
on experienced control. To this end Experiment 3 exploited the fact that subliminal 
forced-choice priming tasks produce under certain conditions a response pattern 
opposite to the one reported in Experiments 1 and 2, i.e., a performance deficit rather 
than a benefit occurs for congruent compared to incongruent prime–target–pairs. 
The phenomenon when participants produce slower responses and more errors on 
congruent compared to neutral or incongruent trials is termed 'reversed priming' and 
was first reported by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998; see also Eimer & Schlaghecken, 
2001, 2002; Eimer, 1999; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000, 2001, 2002; Praamstra & Seiss, 
2005; Aron, Schlaghecken, Fletcher, Bullmore, Eimer, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 
2003; see section 2.3.2 of the present work). In the literature two different 
approaches to account for this phenomenon are discussed (see Enns & Di Lollo, 
2004 for a review). Following the original explanation given by Eimer & 
Schlaghecken (2003) reversed priming is a motor effect and reflects automatic self–
inhibitory processes of motor control which follow the initial automatic activation 
elicited by the masked prime. According to Eimer & Schlaghecken, this happens 
when the SOA separating prime and target is prolonged such that the execution of 
the response to the target is delayed. As a consequence of that SOA-due response 
delay, automatic, i.e., unconscious self–inhibitory processes of motor control 
intervene and reverse the initial response–activation elicited by the prime (Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 2002). Consistent with that idea LRP-recording revealed an initial 
activation of the prime–related, i.e., correct response immediately after prime–onset. 
Thus, the LRP curve indicates a negative deflection from a baseline level of 
activation contralateral to the prime–mapped hand followed by a polarity–shift 300–
400 ms after prime onset. This polarity shift is seen as a positive deflection from 
baseline contralateral to the prime–mapped hand which was interpreted to indicate 
an inhibition of the primed and thus a relative activation benefit of the non–primed, 
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i.e., incorrect response tendency (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Praamstra & Seiss, 
2005). By systematically varying mask–target SOA in a subsequent study, this 
reversal was found to occur by rule when mask–target SOA exceeded about 90 ms 
(Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000; also Praamstra & Seiss, 2005) provided that the initial 
activation was sufficiently strong to have surpassed some 'inhibition threshold' 
(Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002).  According to the alternative explanation, reversed 
priming is principally a perceptual effect that reflects automatic updating of the visual 
system whenever one tracks a dynamic visual scene (Enns & DiLollo, 1997; Lleras & 
Enns, 2004; see Enns & DiLollo, 2004 for a review). The starting point for this 
alternative account was the finding that incompatible priming was obtained only 
with masks that consisted of the visual features that made up the stimuli used as 
primes. This was the case in the original 'reversed priming study' by Eimer and 
Schlaghecken (1998) where primes and targets consisted of left– and right pointing 
arrows and the mask was made up of mixed arrows superimposed on one another. 
Masks of that kind, however, were found to contain information relevant to the 
target–related responses (Lleras & Enns, 2004). In contrast, studies using a neutral 
(response–unrelated) mask, e.g., a mask consisting of four dots (Enns & DiLollo, 
1997), ordinary compatible priming was obtained also when prime–mask–target 
interval was prolonged. Prolonged prime–mask–target interval –not mask–shape– 
was considered critical to produce incompatible priming effects according to Eimer 
and Schlaghecken's activation–followed–by–inhibition–hypothesis (e.g., Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 1998, 2001, 2002; Klapp & Hinkley 2002). It can thus not account for 
the observation made by Enns and DiLollo (1997). Accordingly, they proposed an 
alternative explanation according to which reversed priming relies on automatic 
perceptual updating mechanisms of the visual system when confronted with a 
dynamic visual scene. The masked priming paradigm is a dynamic visual scene. 
Typically, stimulus succession is extraordinarily rapid such that the mask follows 
even before processing of the prime has been completed. Therefore, processing of 
the two stimuli interacts. When the mask is a composite of the primes each mapped 
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to a specific response, as in the Eimer-Schlaghecken study, the visual system 
extracts that part of perceptual information added by the mask that is (1) of 
relevance to the present task and that (2) goes beyond the information that has been 
provided by the preceding prime. For instance, when a left–pointing arrow is 
followed by a mixed–pointing arrow mask (as in Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998) task–
relevant perceptual updating will pertain to the right–pointing arrow included in 
the mask–pattern. Provided the target follows the mask at a sufficiently short delay 
the visual system is caught in a time window when the 'different–from–prime' 
component added by the mask is dominant. In this situation, the succeeding target 
will be processed and responded to in a facilitated way when it is congruent with 
these most recent features of the mask. Yet importantly, these mask–features are at 
the same time the features of the prime–incongruent target. Thus, the 'different–
from–prime–and–also–response–relevant' features that are added by the mask act as 
a congruent prime for the response related to the prime–incongruent target. In 
conclusion, according to the alternative explanation by Llerras and Enns (2004) the 
processes which underlie the phenomenon of reversed priming are supposedly 
activational and primarily perceptual rather than inhibitory and purely motor as 
suggested by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998, 2003).  
 
Of particular interest with respect to the present work is the finding that reversed 
priming effects arise not only for instructed responses which are mapped to an 
imperative target stimulus but also for actions that are freely chosen by participants 
(Klapp & Hinkley, 2002, Experiment 5; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; see section 2.3.2 
of the current work). In Experiment 3 it was attempted to go one step further. In 
detail, it was hypothesized that under reversed priming conditions the influence of 
masked "effect"–primes on experienced control would reverse accordingly. This was 
assumed because under reversed priming conditions the supposed comparison 
process should yield a discrepancy after congruent "effect"–priming and 
respectively detect a match after incongruent prime–effect pairs. Thus, it was 
predicted that compatible priming of an effect representation prior to action would 
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decrease experienced control over stimuli following participants freely chosen 
actions as alleged "effects" such that higher control–judgments should be given for 
incompatible compared to neutral or compatible prime–"effect" pairs.  
 
To establish conditions adequate to produce an incompatible priming effect 
Experiment 3 commenced with a pilot study which included only a forced–choice 
priming task and measures of prime–perceptibility. The control–judgment task was 
conducted in the subsequent main study using a different and again naïve sample of 
participants.  
 
 
3. 4. 1  Pilot study: Forced-choice priming task 
 
3. 4. 1. 1 Methods and procedure 
 
Participants 
Twelve volunteers (7 female, all right–handed, naïve and of normal or corrected to 
normal vision), 19–34 years of age (mean 23.9 years) from Dresden University of 
Technology participated after having given their written informed approval. 
 
 
Stimuli 
Primes consisted of a diamond sized 1.8 cm x 1.8 cm and a square sized 1.2 cm x 1.2 
cm. The neutral prime was a star–shaped composite of diamond and square super–
imposed on one another. Targets were larger replica of the primes: a diamond sized 
2.5 cm x 2.5 cm and a square sized 1.8 cm x 1.8 cm. The mask was the 2.5 cm x 2.5 
cm sized star–shaped composite of diamond and square. Importantly, the mask thus 
included the perceptual features of both primes respectively targets. All stimuli 
were presented in black on a white background. Stimuli are seen in Figure 14. 
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Forced–choice priming 
Trials began with the 50 ms long presentation of a prime which was followed by the 
mask shown for 100 ms and a target remaining on screen until a response was 
made. The next trial started after a delay of 1s. All stimuli were presented at 
fixation. Participants were instructed to press as fast and as accurate as possible a 
left or a right key to indicate whether the target was a diamond or a square. Key–
target mapping was counterbalanced across participants. Prime–target pairs were 
either congruent, e.g., a diamond–target following a diamond–prime, incongruent, 
e.g., diamond–target following square–prime, or neutral, i.e., diamond or square 
following the neutral prime. After 15 practice trials, 50 congruent, 50 incongruent 
and 50 neutral trials were delivered in random order. With the mask being 
composed of the visual features of both primes respectively targets presented for 
100 ms on each trial a reversed priming effect was expected. Thus, responses were 
predicted to be faster and more accurate on incongruent compared to neutral or 
congruent trials. Figure 14 shows series and durations of events on a trial in  the 
pilot study of Experiment 3 for the three conditions of prime-target-congruity. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Experimental setup of the ‘reversed’-priming task in Experiment 3 (pilot-study). Sequence 
and durations of events on a trial for the three conditions of prime–target–congruity. 
 
 
Congruent Incongruent Neutral 
Time 
50 ms 
100 ms 
until 
keypress 
prime 
mask/ 
go-signal 
target 
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Prime identification 
After the priming–task participants received a questionnaire to indicate whether 
they had seen anything on the monitor except for the mask and the target stimuli 
and if so, what they had seen (see Appendix B 3). Then they were informed about 
the presence of primes and accomplished a forced–choice identification task which 
consisted of the same materials as in the priming–task except that the target stimuli 
were omitted. On 100 trials, i.e., 50 trials each prime, they pressed a left– or a right 
key to indicate whether a diamond or a square was presented. The neutral prime 
was omitted. Primes were displayed in random order. The expected mean rate of 
correctly identified primes was expected at the chance level of guessing which was 
at 50%. 
 
 
3. 4. 1. 2 Results and conclusion 
 
Prime–perceptibility 
None of the participants claimed to have seen the primes. In the forced–choice 
prime–identification task participants on average identified 50.08% of primes 
correctly which did not differ from chance level (p > .90). 
 
 
Response priming 
Incorrect responses [overall mean error rate = 4.04%, SD = 3.46] and responses 
exceeding a latency of 1500 ms [overall mean RT = 529 ms, SD = 48.09] were 
discarded. As seen in Figure 16 (right panel), a reversed priming effect was 
obtained. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that mean RTs were significantly 
faster after incongruent compared to neutral or congruent trials [F(2, 22) = 6.35, p < 
.008, MSE = 473.69]. A two tailed paired t-test confirmed that responses were 
significantly faster on incongruent compared to congruent trials [t(11) = 3.07, p < 
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.012, SD = 34.54]. These results indicate that even though the primes were not 
consciously perceived they modulated participants' responses in the priming task as 
indicated by the reversed priming effect.  
 
 
3. 4. 2  Main study: Free-choice control–judgment task 
 
As intended, a reversed priming effect was obtained in the pilot study. Prime–
perceptibility was at chance level. Thus, it was now attempted to investigate 
whether under these ‘reversed priming conditions’ the pattern of control–judgments 
obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 would reverse accordingly. To this end the free–
choice control–judgment task introduced in Experiment 2 was conducted using the 
stimuli, masking– and priming–conditions that yielded reversed priming in the 
pilot experiment. In the control judgment task, the masked primes were expected to 
activate the "opposite–to–effect–prime representation" producing a reverse 
modulation of experienced control. Control judgments were predicted to be lower 
after blocks containing congruent compared to blocks including neutral or 
incongruent prime–“effect” pairs.  
 
 
3. 4. 2. 1 Methods and procedure 
 
Participants 
Twenty–four undergraduates from Dresden University of Technology (17 female, 
all right–handed and of normal or corrected to normal eye–vision) aged 18–47 years 
(mean age: 21.7 years) gave their written consent to participate for course credit or € 
4.  
 
Control–judgment task 
Stimuli and procedure. Stimuli were the same as in the pilot priming–study except 
that the stimuli that were used as targets in the priming study were now used as 
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“effect”-stimuli. Thus, as Figure 15 shows, trials commenced with the presentation 
of a prime (50 ms) which was replaced by the mask appearing simultaneously with 
the auditory click-tone go-signal (cf. Experiments 1 and 2). The mask was presented 
for 100 ms and then replaced by a blank screen which remained until a response 
was made. Participants were instructed to choose freely whether to press the left or 
right out of two indicated buttons on the computer keyboard as soon as they 
received the go–signal. They were asked to press both keys approximately equally 
often while avoiding systematic alternations or runs. Immediately after the key–
press, either a diamond or a square appeared for 2 s as the alleged “effect” of the 
key–press. After a delay of 1 s the next trial started. Participants were instructed to 
try to find out whether by pressing the left or the right key they could control 
whether a diamond or a square appeared on the screen.  
 
Design and prediction. There was no systematic correlation between participants´ 
freely chosen key–presses and the identity of the alleged “effect”–stimuli. Instead, 
one of the two stimuli appeared with a probability of 75%, while the other appeared 
with a probability of 25% irrespective of which key was pressed. Stimulus 
assignment to probabilities was counterbalanced across participants. Thus 
participants had no control over which figure appeared. The critical independent 
variable was the relation between the shape of the prime and the shape of the 
stimulus that appeared as the alleged effect. This relation was either congruent, e.g., 
a diamond-effect following a diamond-prime, incongruent; e.g., a diamond-effect 
following a square-prime, or neutral, i.e., diamond- or square-effect following the 
neutral prime. In Figure 15 sequence and durations of events in the control 
judgment task of experiment 3 are illustrated. Participants performed 6 blocks by 40 
trials, two of which included only congruent, two only incongruent, and two only 
neutral prime–effect pairs. Order of congruity conditions was counter–balanced 
across participants.  
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After each block, participants rated how much control they thought they had over 
diamond and square on a scale ranging from 0% for “no control” to 100% for 
“complete control” (see Appendix A3). Control–judgments were expected to be 
lower after blocks with congruent compared to neutral or incongruent prime–"effect" 
pairs. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Experimental setup of the control–judgment task in Experiment 3 (main study). Sequence 
and duration of events on a trial for the three conditions of prime–“effect”–congruity. 
 
 
Prime–identification task 
After the control–judgment task participants were asked on a questionnaire whether 
they had seen anything on the monitor except for the mask and the effect–stimuli, 
and if so, what they had seen (see Appendix B3). Then they performed the prime–
identification task. Materials and procedure were the same as in the pilot study 
except that, this time, all three primes (including also the neutral prime) were at 
proposal. Participants who were now informed about the presence of primes 
performed 33 trials in which they were asked to indicate prime–identity by pressing 
left–, right–, or space–key.  
 
 
Congruent Incongruent Neutral 
Time 
or or or 
50 ms 
100 ms 
until 
keypress 
2000 ms 
„effect“-prime 
mask/ 
go-signal 
blank 
   
„effect“ 
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3. 4. 2. 2 Results 
 
Prime–perceptibility 
Only one participant declared identification of the primes and was thus excluded 
from the analyses. In the prime–identification task the remaining participants´ mean 
rate of correctly identified primes was 35% which was not significantly better than 
33% chance as revealed by a t-test, [p > .40]. 
 
Control–judgments 
Mean control–judgments were computed by block and collapsed over the two 
blocks of each condition of prime–"effect" congruity. As predicted, mean control–
judgments were lower after congruent than after neutral blocks, and lower after 
neutral blocks compared to incongruent blocks. In a repeated measures ANOVA, 
the main effect of congruity nearly reached significance [F(2, 44) = 3.14, p = .053, 
MSE =136.07]. A two-tailed paired t-test revealed that control–judgments were 
reliably smaller on congruent than on incongruent trials [t(22) = –2.6, p < .02, SD = 
14.38]. Over all mean RT of the free-choice key-presses was 426.93 ms [SD 163.03]. 
There were no significant RT-differences between conditions [p > .9]. 
   
Figure 16. Results of Experiment 3. Left panel: Reversed modulation of experienced control observed 
in the control judgment task (main study) . Mean control–judgments were lower for 
congruent compared to neutral or incongruent trials. Right panel: Corresponding to the 
reversed modulation of experienced control, mean RTs in the pilot priming study were 
lower for congruent compared neutral of incongruent trials. Error bars show 95% within–
subject confidence intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
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3. 4. 2. 3 Discussion 
 
In a priming paradigm that yielded a reversed priming effect as indicated by slower 
responses in a forced–choice priming task on trials with congruent compared to 
trials with incongruent prime–target pairs the pattern of control–judgments 
reversed accordingly. In a free-choice control judgment task participants 
experienced less control over alleged action-"effects" after blocks with congruent 
compared to blocks with neutral or incongruent prime–"effect" pairs. The 
modulatory impact of the effect–primes on experienced control was again 
independent from conscious awareness, as indicated by the fact that performance in 
the prime–identification task was at chance level. 
 
 
Which process may underlie this result? The 'pure' motor explanation (automatic 
response inhibition followed by initial activation) (e.g., Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; 
Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) can account many 
findings made in forced-choice reaction paradigms. Yet, it cannot fully explain the 
findings made in the present experiment – why? In the control judgment task 
participants did not perform a forced-choice response mapped to an imperative 
stimulus. Rather they performed a freely chosen action whenever the received an 
'unspecific' go-signal. This suggests that if an inhibitory process was at work it 
would in the present experiment be primarily a perceptual rather than a motor 
effect. Thus, if inhibition was at work it would concern the perceptual pattern of the 
anticipatory "effect"–representation elicited by the masked prime. Following this 
train of thought it would be conceivable that when inhibited, the primed "effect"–
pattern would be no longer available to the post–action comparison process tuned 
to match anticipated and observed action–"effect". With the primed effect 
representation being inhibited below some –hypothetical– baseline level of 
activation there should be a relative supremacy in activation of the non–primed, i.e., 
incongruent "effect"–representation. This ‘relatively more active’ effect-
representation would in turn be available to the comparison process suggested to 
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compare anticipated and actually perceived consequences of action. The comparison 
would, as a result, yield higher control judgments for incongruent than for 
congruent prime–"effect" pairs. This explanation, however, holds only for situations 
with not more than two potential action effects at proposal. 
 
Assuming that reversed priming effects would rely on automatic perceptual 
updating mechanisms of the visual system (e.g., Llerras & Enns, 2004) the reversed 
pattern of the control judgments in the present experiment would not be inhibitory 
but activational. The 'different–from–prime–and–also–task–relevant' feature added 
by the mask would activate a representation of the incongruent, i.e., non–primed 
"effect"–stimulus. Supposed this most recently updated "effect"–representation 
became available to the comparison module, control should more likely be 
attributed to the self if the subsequent "effect"–stimulus was the prime-incongruent 
one, because it would be congruent with the new mask features. Conversely, when 
the effect is congruent with the prime – but incongruent with the new mask features 
– control would rather be ascribed to an external cause.  
 
Would this explanation – with the conscious mask as an additional "effect"prime – 
challenge the assumption that the matching–process underlying authorship 
ascription is unconscious and due to the prime? I suppose that it would not. Even 
though the perceptual component relevant to the internal comparison module is 
part of the –visibly presented– mask, the systematic manipulation of experienced 
control would still root in the prior –nonperceptible– prime. With the prime being 
omitted the mask should not function any longer as a relevant prime. Rather 
without the preceding prime the mask–shape should be processed 'as a whole' and 
thus a neutral stimulus without specific relevance concerning the control decision. 
Thus supposedly, only because of their novelty in relation to the preceding 
unconscious prime the 'different–from–prime–and–also–task–relevant' features of 
the mask functioned as an update relevant to the control decision. Certainly the 
present data do not provide a clear answer whether in the present case the effect-
Chapter 3:  Experimental Part                                                                                  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
77
anticipation was unconscious or conscious because of the visible mask. However, 
that the unconscious anticipatory effect-prime did have a systematic and control–
relevant impact is clearly indicated by the fact that control judgments differed 
systematically dependent on the three conditions of prime–"effect" congruity. 
 
 
 
3.5 Experiment 4 – ‘Reversed’ modulation of experienced 
“effect”-predictability in free-choice action 
 
To obtain a more solid base for the observation that the direction to which 
experienced control is modulated by priming a representation of an event following 
participant's action as an alleged effect reverses under conditions of incompatible 
priming Experiment 4 was conducted. Therefore, the procedure and stimuli 
established in Experiment 3 were retained. As the only modification the assessment 
of experienced control was changed. The literature reveals that experienced control 
has been operationalized in many different ways (e.g., Skinner, 1985, 1996; Haidt & 
Rodin, 1999; Presson & Benassi, 1996). As an alternative frequently used measure of 
experienced control participants in Experiment 4 were asked for judgments of 
experienced “effect”-predictability (e.g., Benassi, Sweeney & Drevno, 1979).  
 
 
3. 5. 1  Methods 
 
Participants  
Twenty–four undergraduates from Dresden University of Technology (16 female, 2 
left–handed), aged 18–30 years (mean: 22 years) participated for course credit or € 4 
after having given written informed approval. All had normal or corrected to 
normal eye–vision and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment.  
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Prediction- judgment task 
Stimuli and procedure were exactly the same as in Experiment 3 and are thus shown 
in Figure 15. Different from Experiment 3 participants were at this time asked to try 
to predict in a silent manner to themselves immediately before they pressed a self–
chosen left–or right key whether a diamond or a square would appear subsequently. 
As in the previous experiments there was no systematic correlation between the 
freely chosen key–presses and the identity of the alleged “effect”–stimuli. 
Participants had thus no control over whether a square or diamond appeared on the 
screen. Both, diamond and square appeared with a probability of 50% irrespective of 
which key was pressed. Which “effect” appeared depended on the masked prime 
delivered before subject's key–press. Primes and “effects” on a trial were congruent, 
incongruent, or neutral. Congruity conditions were again realized block-wise. Each 
block included 40 trials, 2 with only congruent, 2 with only incongruent and 2 
blocks with only neutral prime–"effect" pairs. After each of the six blocks 
participants rated the percentual amount of how many "effect"–stimuli they had 
correctly predicted on a scale ranging from 0% for “always wrong” to 100% “always 
correct”. The judgment scale experienced “effect”-predictability is shown in Figure 
17 and in the original German version in Appendix A 4. 
 
 
Please estimate the hit rate of your predictions over whether a diamond or square 
appeared on the screen! 
  
My predictions were correct in … 
 
          
          
 0%                                                                           50%                                                                    100% 
                                                                                                                                                          ..… of all cases. 
                   
Figure 17. Judgment-scale of experienced “effect”-predictability in Experiment 4. The original 
version in German can be seen in Appendix A 4. 
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Forced–choice priming task and prime–identification assessment 
To measure whether a reverse priming effect was obtained, a forced–choice priming 
task was conducted. Prime–perceptibility was assessed via awareness–questionnaire 
and forced–choice prime identification task. Materials and procedure used in these 
tasks were identical with the pilot priming study of Experiment 3 and are seen in 
Figure 14.  
 
 
3. 5. 2  Data analyses and  results 
 
Prime perceptibility 
 None of the participants declared identification of the primes. In the prime–
identification task, the mean rate of correctly identified primes was 35.7%. As 
confirmed by a t-test this performance did not significantly differ from 33.3% chance 
level [p > .3]. 
 
Forced–choice priming 
Incorrect responses [overall mean error rate = 2.69 %, SD = 2.12] and responses 
exceeding a latency of 1500 ms [overall mean RT = 544.69, SD = 53.9} were 
discarded. As seen in Figure 18, right panel, a reversed priming effect was obtained. 
Thus as predicted, mean RTs were faster after incongruent compared to neutral 
trials, and faster after neutral compared to congruent trials. A repeated measures 
ANOVA substantiated this pattern yielding a significant main effect of prime-
target-congruity [F(2, 46) = 14.51, p < .001, MSE = 307.148]. A two tailed paire t-test 
confirmed that responses were significantly faster on incongruent compared to 
congruent trials [t(23) = 4.24 , p < .001, SD = 30.56]. An ANOVA for mean error rates 
also yielded a reliable main effect of prime-target-congruity [F(2, 46) = 4.19, p < .03, 
MSE = 7.46]. Participants committed most errors on congruent trials compared to 
incongruent or neutral trials. Two tailed paired t-test comparisons indicated a 
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significant difference in error rates between congruent and neutral trials [t(23) = 
2.44, p < .03, SD = 4.58], but not between congruent and incongruent trials [p > .09}. 
 
Experienced “effect”-predictability 
For each participant mean prediction-judgments were computed by block and then 
collapsed over the two blocks of each prime–effect congruity condition. As Figure 
18, left panel, shows participants judged “effect”-predictability as less after blocks 
with congruent compared to neutral prime–"effect" pairs and as less after blocks 
with neutral compared to incongruent prime–"effect" pairs. A repeated measures 
ANOVA substantiated this pattern yielding a significant main effect of prime-
“effect”-congruity [F(2, 46) = 5.82, p < .007, MSE = 52.18]. A two-tailed paired t-test 
revealed that “effect”-predictability was judged reliably lower after blocks with 
congruent compared to blocks with neutral prime-"effect"-pairs [t(23) = –3.08, p < 
.006, SD = 8.64], and lower after neutral compared to incongruent prime–"effect" 
pairs [t(23) = –3.16, p < .005, SD = 10.38]. Importantly though, planned comparisons 
revealed that in all three conditions of prime-“effect” congruity left and right keys 
were followed virtually equally often by diamond as they were followed by square 
such that there was no actual systematic contingency of participants' keypresses and 
the alleged effects. Left keypresses were followed virtually equally often by 
diamond as they were followed by square in the congruent [p > . 8], the neutral [p .3] 
and the incongruent condition [p > .1]. Similarly, right presses were followed 
equally often by diamond as they were followed by square in the congruent [p > .3], 
the neutral [p > .3], and the incongruent condition [p > .1]. Over all mean RT of the 
free-choice key-presses was 534.28 ms [SD = 204.67] with no significant differences 
between conditions [p > .5].  
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Figure 18. Results of Experiment 4. Left panel: Mean estimates of “effect”-predictability in the 
prediction–judgment task show a reversed priming effect. Predictability was estimated to 
be less after congruent compared to neutral or incongruent prime-“effect”-pairs. Right 
panel: Corresponding mean RTs in the forced–choice priming task reflect also a reversed 
priming effect. Responses were slower after congruent compared to neutral or 
incongruent prime–target pairs. Error bars show 95% within–participant confidence 
intervals (Loftus & Masson, 1994).  
 
 
3. 5. 3   Discussion 
 
Experiment 4 replicated the data of Experiment 3 by using judgments of 
experienced "effect"-predictability as an alternative measure of experienced control 
(e.g., Presson & Benassi, 1996). Under conditions which in a forced–choice priming 
task produced a reversed priming effect, i.e., response costs on compatible relative 
to neutral or incompatible trials, the pattern of experienced “effect”-predictability 
for stimuli which followed participants' actions "effects" reversed accordingly. 
“Effect”-predictability was judged substantially lower after blocks including 
congruent compared to blocks including neutral or incongruent prime–"effect" 
pairs. Again this prime–dependent modulation of experienced “effect”-
predictability occurred even though the masked effect–primes remained strictly 
unconscious and irrespective of the fact, that there was in reality no systematic 
correlation between participants' actions and the subsequent post-action-"effects". 
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This was indicated by the finding that there was no systematic correlation between 
participants' key-presses and the alleged "effects".  
 
In conclusion, the results obtained Experiment 4 uphold the suggestion that under 
reverse priming–conditions a primed “effect”–anticipation is updated by those new 
features of the subsequent mask that are of relevance to the conscious control 
decision and go beyond the information given by the preceding "effect" prime. As in 
the present case, these mask–features are those of the prime–incongruent "effect"–
stimulus. Thus, the suggested post–action comparison process which matches 
anticipated and perceived action effect to yield a conscious control decision will 
detect a match after blocks including incongruent prime–"effect" pairs. Conversely, 
a mismatch will be detected after blocks including congruent prime–"effect" pairs. 
As consistent with this idea participants experienced “effect”–predictability as 
higher, i.e., they experienced a higher degree of control after blocks containing 
incongruent compared to blocks containing neutral or congruent prime–effect pairs.  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
General discussion 
 
 
4. 1   Summary of results 
 
The central aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of unconscious effect-
anticipation in the generation of the experience of voluntary control. More precisely, 
it was hypothesized (1) that effect-anticipations systematically modulate the degree 
to which people experience to be in control over perceptual events which follow 
their actions as alleged effects even when these “effects” are in reality not 
systematically related to those actions and thus not under the control of the 
participants; (2) that this modulation of experienced control occurs even when 
effect-anticipations are induced by subliminal effect-primes which remain below the 
threshold of conscious awareness. In other words it was attempted to induce an 
illusion of control in participants by priming unconscious “effect”–anticipations.  
 
To realize this aim, four experiments each including a control judgment task and 
two supplementary reaction time tasks were designed and yielded support for the 
prediction. In the control judgment task participants performed on each trial free or 
forced choice actions which were followed by one of two visual “effect”–stimuli. 
Unbeknownst to participants each action was preceded by a masked effect-prime 
that was presented so briefly that it remained invisible (e.g., Merikle, Smilek, & 
Eastwood, 2001; Merikle & Reingold, 1998; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Naccache & 
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Dehaene, 2001; Kunde, Kiesel & Hoffmann, 2003; Marcel, 1983). This effect-prime 
was either congruent or incongruent with the post–action “effect”–stimulus. 
Importantly there was only a limited (Experiment 1) or no systematic correlation 
(Experiments 2-4) between the actions and the post-action “effect”–stimuli such that 
participants had only limited or no control over the effects. Based on a theoretical 
model of the generation of the experience of conscious control, it was predicted that 
activating a congruent representation of the post–action stimulus before each action 
would induce a tendency in the participants to overestimate the amount of control 
they had over the “effect”–stimuli compared to when an unrelated or an 
incongruent “effect”–representation was primed. This effect was expected to occur 
even when the primed “effect”–representation remained unconscious.  
 
In support of this prediction, Experiment 1 revealed that unconscious effect primes 
which activated a perceptual representation of the shape of an action-effect 
systematically modulated the degree to which participants experienced to be in 
control over perceptual events which followed their actions as potential effects even 
though in fact participants had only a limited degree of control over the post action 
effect stimuli. In the control judgment task participants experienced a higher degree 
of control over the post–action effect stimulus after blocks with congruent prime–
effect pairs than after blocks with incongruent or neutral prime–effect pairs. This 
modulation of experienced control occurred even though participants were 
unaware of the primed effect–anticipations as confirmed by a forced–choice prime–
identification task in which participants’ performance did not differ significantly 
from chance level. That the primes nevertheless activated a representation of their 
particular shape was confirmed by the results of a forced–choice masked priming 
task in which participants made faster and more accurate responses on trials with 
congruent compared to trials with neutral or incongruent prime–target pairs. 
 
Experiment 2 substantiated and extended the findings of Experiment 1. Masked 
priming of alleged effect–stimuli systematically modulated the degree of 
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experienced control even when actions in the control judgment task were freely 
chosen by participants and when there was absolutely no systematic correlation 
between these actions and the post–action "effect"–stimuli. Moreover, Experiment 2 
further extended the findings obtained in Experiment 1 by using masked semantic 
effect-primes (color words). This revealed that unconscious effect-anticipations 
affect conscious control experience up to a conceptual – rather than a merely physical 
– level of representation (Dehaene et al., 1998, 2001; Fairhall, Hamm, & Kirk, 2006; 
Kiefer & Spitzer, 2000).  
 
Experiments 3 and 4 revealed that the impact of unconscious "effect"–primes on 
experienced control found in Experiments 1 and 2 can be reversed when the masked 
effect-primes generate a reversed priming effect as it was first discovered in forced-
choice response priming studies by Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998). ”Reversed 
priming” in this context denotes the phenomenon that under certain conditions 
response costs – rather than benefits - arise on trials with congruent compared to 
trials with neutral or incongruent prime–target pairs (see also Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 2001, 2003; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004, 2002; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; 
Klapp & Haas, 2005; Llerras & Enns, 2004). To establish a reversed priming effect 
Experiment 3 commenced with a pilot study which consisted of a forced choice 
priming task. After the pilot experiment had yielded a reversed priming effect the 
main experiment including the free-choice control judgment task was conducted. As 
predicted the pattern of participants' control–judgments now reversed accordingly, 
i.e., participants experienced less control after blocks including congruent compared 
to blocks including neutral or incongruent prime–“effect” pairs. This reversed 
modulation of conscious control occurred again albeit the primes remained 
completely unconscious. This result was discussed in the context of the perceptual 
updating hypothesis (e.g., Llerras & Enns, 2004; Enns & Di Lollo, 2004).  
 
With respect to the perceptual updating hypothesis, it is critical that in the present 
case the mask consisted of a superimposition of the shapes of both primes (diamond 
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and square) and was presented sufficiently long to enable the visual system to 
extract that part of the visual information included in the mask that differed from 
the information included in the preceding prime. Importantly, this information 
included precisely the visual features of the opposite (i.e. incongruent) effect-
stimulus. Thus, it was supposed that under these circumstances the effect-
anticipation elicited by the prime was updated or replaced by the new visual 
information added by the mask, which was in the current case the shape of the 
opposite, i.e., prime-incongruent “effect”. Because this updating process supposedly 
also “reversed” the effect-anticipations, the comparison between anticipated and 
observed action “effect” detected a match on incongruent prime-effect pairs and a 
mismatch on congruent prime-effect pairs. Consequently, experienced control was 
lower on congruent compared to incongruent trials, i.e., the pattern of control 
judgments reversed. 
 
Experiment 4 conceptually replicated the reversed pattern of experienced control 
obtained in Experiment 3 using judgments of “prediction accuracy” as an 
alternative measure of experienced control.6 Using the stimulus material and 
priming conditions that had produced a reversed priming effect in Experiment 3, 
participants judged their predictions to be more accurate after incongruent compared 
to neutral or congruent prime–"effect" blocks. Again this reversed modulation of 
conscious control occurred even though participants were unable to consciously 
recognize the masked effect–primes in the forced choice prime identification task.  
 
In summary, the results obtained in this thesis provide strong evidence that an 
illusion of conscious control over objectively uncontrollable events which follow 
                                                 
6 Previous research on experienced control, particularly on “illusory control” (e.g., Langer, 1975; 
Langer & Rodin, 1976) has shown that judgments of how well one can predict the outcome of an 
event (e.g. the outcome of one’s performance in a gambling task) correlates highly with the degree of 
experienced control (cf. Presson & Benassi, 1996). At the same time judgment of prediction accuracy 
is a less obvious way to measure experienced control than to ask directly for a judgment of 
experienced control. This ensures participants’ naivety to the experimental purpose. Therefore 
judgments of “prediction accuracy” established as a popular way to operationalize experienced 
control. 
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one’s actions can be induced by priming a representation of these events prior to the 
actions. Moreover, the results show convincingly that such a modulation of 
conscious control occurs even when the primed “effect” representations remain 
completely unconscious.  
 
 
 
4. 2  The present data in relation to earlier work 
 
On a fundamental level the findings obtained in the present thesis are in line with 
the well established idea that the ability to anticipate the future effects of one’s 
actions plays a central role not only in the control of action but also in the generation 
of the experience of control (Haggard, 2005; Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004; see also 
James, 1890; Lotze, 1852; Michotte, 1954/1963;). In this respect the current results are 
also consistent with earlier work that has documented that unconscious effect–
anticipations, which are activated by subliminal effect-primes, influence the 
selection and initiation of voluntary actions (e.g., Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Wendt–Kuerschner, 2006; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; 
Neumann & Klotz, 1994). Importantly, the present data extend these insights by 
revealing that unconscious effect–anticipations also influence the experience of 
voluntary control.  
 
In a narrower context, the current results indicate that the experience of control over 
sensory events emerges from a comparison process that continuously matches 
actual and anticipated effects of one’s actions. If anticipated and actual action-effects 
coincide, there is an increased tendency to experience the effects as self–caused, 
whereas a discrepancy between anticipated and actual effect increases the tendency 
to attribute the effects to an external cause (Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000, 2002). That the modulation of conscious control 
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occurred independently from whether the effect–primes were available to 
awareness supports the idea that this process does not depend on consciousness, 
but supports the idea that the process by which anticipated and actual action effects 
are compared does not depend on consciousness, but often occurs unconsciously 
(Linser & Goschke, 2006).  
 
 
4. 2. 1   The present data and Wegner’s theory of apparent mental 
causation – The role of unconscious processes in the 
generation of experienced control 
 
 
The present findings are consistent with the idea that events which are close in 
space and time are more likely to be perceived as causally linked than 
spatiotemporally distant events (Hume, 1748; Michotte, 1963; Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002) and are in this respect consistent with Wegner’s theory of apparent 
mental causation (Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004). According to the key proposal of his 
theory the experience of conscious will rests on a perceived link between 
anticipatory thoughts about an action and the subsequent action itself: voluntary 
control experience occurs when an action effect has been anticipated consistently and 
immediately prior to the action and the anticipatory thought about the action 
appears to be the exclusive plausible cause of the action (Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004). 
The present data go beyond the assumption of this concept demonstrating that the 
conscious experience of control is influenced even by unconscious information about 
action effects. Evidently in this case, the control experience can not rely on a 
consciously perceived link between anticipated and actual effects.  
 
Initial evidence that unconscious information related to an actor modulates 
experienced control was obtained by Dijksterhuis, Wegner, and Aarts (2001). They 
could show that perceived agency can be modulated unconsciously by subliminal 
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prime words which directed the attention to the "self" of the actor. Participants' task 
in this study was to categorize letter–strings as words or non–words as rapidly as 
possible in an alleged competition with the computer. The screen displaying the 
letters either went blank when the participant pushed the correct response key or it 
was turned blank automatically shortly after the presentation of the letters. Thus for 
the participants it was uncertain whether they or the computer had turned off the 
display. Prior to each letter string the masked word "I", "me" or some neutral word 
was displayed. Although participants denied to have seen the primes, they 
influenced their judgments of authorship: They judged to have beaten the computer 
more often when a self–relevant pronoun had been primed compared to when a 
neutral word had been shown. It was concluded that being confronted with self–
related information systematically increases perceived control even when this 
information remained unconscious.  
 
In another recent study Aarts, Custers and Wegner (2005) furthermore observed 
that the feeling of control over in fact externally caused response–effects is enhanced 
through subliminally delivered information about the location of action effects. In 
this task participants moved a target shifting along a rectangular path consisting of 
several separate fields on the computer display. Concurrently a second target which 
was controlled by the computer moved along the same track, but in opposite 
direction. In response to a tone–signal participants had to stop the movement by 
pressing a stop–key. When stopped the two targets were replaced by just one “stop-
target” located on one of the fields. Participants had to decide whether the location 
of that "stop–target" indicated the stopping position of either their or the computer's 
target. The critical manipulation was that immediately prior to each stop the 
location of the final "stop–target" either was or was not subliminally primed by a 
brief flash at the respective stop–target location. As hypothesized these effect–
previews systematically biased participant's responses. The degree to which 
participants experienced to have caused the stops by themselves was higher after 
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primed compared to non–primed stop–locations although on about 45% of the trials 
the location-primes were not consciously perceived. 
 
The present results extend these previous findings in at least three important 
respects. Firstly, they provide clear evidence for a modulating impact of effect–
primes on experienced control even if the primes remained unconscious according 
to a much stricter forced–choice recognition criterion – rather than a retrospective 
self–report criterion as used in the experiments of Wegner and his colleagues. 
Secondly, the present results show that an illusion of control can be induced by 
priming a representation of an alleged action–effect before a freely chosen action – 
rather than an externally triggered fixed response. Thirdly, the current data reveal 
that the influence of unconscious effect–representations on experienced control are 
not restricted to the priming of the location of an action effect as shown by Wegner 
and colleagues, but rather holds also for primes which activate a representation of 
the shape or meaning of effect–stimuli. This shows that unconscious effect 
anticipations elicited by masked effect-primes are processed up to a conceptual level 
(cf. Linser & Goschke, 2006).  
 
The above discussed findings all refer to cases in which the experience of control 
could not rely on a consciously perceived link between anticipated and actual action 
effects, because the critical effect-representation remained unconscious. They go 
thus beyond the explanatory scope of the theory of apparent mental causation 
(Wegner, 2002) and thus raise the question of which mechanisms mediated the 
influence of unconscious effect–primes on conscious control? In the next section, 
possible answers to this question will be discussed in relation to the internal 
forward model theory (e.g., Frith, 2005; Haggard, 2005).  
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4. 2. 2 Which mechanisms mediate the influence of unconscious 
effect–primes on conscious control? The present data in 
relation to the internal forward model theory 
 
On a theoretical level the present findings raise the question of how the match 
between anticipated and alleged actual effects could have influenced experienced 
control although the anticipatory representation of the effect remained unconscious 
(cf. Linser & Goschke, 2006). One possible mechanism that may underlie the 
unconscious modulation of conscious control is suggested by recent evidence 
indicating that the representation of a correctly predicted sensory effect of an action 
is attenuated and experienced as less intense (Frith, 2005; Frith, Blakemore, & 
Wolpert, 2000; Blakemore, 2003; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000). For instance, 
self–produced tactile stimulations are experienced as less intense compared to when 
the same stimulation is externally produced (Weiskrantz, Elliott, & Darlington, 1971; 
Shergill, Bays, Frith, & Wolpert, 2003). Moreover, the perceived intensity of self–
produced tactile stimulations increases if a temporal delay is inserted between 
participants’ actions and the tactile effects produced by these actions, presumably 
because the timing of the effects is less precisely predicted (Blakemore, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 1999). Furthermore, functional neuroimaging studies have revealed that 
self– compared to externally administered touches produce less activation in 
somatosensory and parietal cortex (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998; Weiller, 
Juptner, Fellows, Rijntjes, Leonhardt, Kiebel, Muller, Diener, & Thilmann, 1996). 
Importantly, sensory attenuation is not restricted to tactile experiences, but appears 
to hold more generally for perceptual experiences following a movement (see Frith, 
2005, for a review).  
 
Sensory attenuation of self–generated sensory stimulation may reflect the fact that 
correct predictions of the sensory effects of voluntary movements are generated on 
the basis of the motor system’s execution commands. This is consistent with current 
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theories of intentional action control (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; 
Haggard, 2005) which are based on the assumption that during goal–directed action 
an “inverse model” maps a goal representation to motor commands that are suited 
to produce a desired effect and which are then sent to the effectors (cf. Linser & 
Goschke, 2006). Simultaneously, an efference copy of the motor command is passed 
on to an “internal predictive model” which computes predictions of the sensory 
effects of the movement even before feedback from the actual execution of the 
movement is received, thereby allowing for rapid adjustments of the movement. If 
the predicted consequences and the actual sensory feedback coincide the 
representation of the sensory effect is attenuated and the effect is experienced as 
self–generated (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). In 
contrast, if a sensory effect is externally generated the forward model generates a 
less precise prediction which leads to a reduced or no attenuation of the sensory 
effect–representation and thus an increased tendency to ascribe the effect to an 
external cause. Consistent with this assumption it has been observed that the 
attenuation of self–caused sensory experiences was absent in schizophrenic patients 
experiencing delusions of alien control (Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone, & Frith, 
2000). Moreover, schizophrenic patients reporting delusions of control also showed 
abnormally high activity in parietal cortex during self–produced voluntary 
movements (Spence, Brooks, Hirsch, Liddle, Meehan, & Grasby, 1997) which might 
reflect reduced attenuation of sensory feedback. This may explain why for these 
patients voluntary movements sometimes feel like passive movements which are 
controlled by alien forces (cf. Frith, 2005). 
 
Applied to the experiments of the present work these considerations suggest that 
subliminal effect–primes presumably produced an analogous attenuation of the 
sensory representation of the effect–stimuli that followed participants’ actions (cf. 
Linser & Goschke, 2006). In experiments 1 and 2 this prime–induced sensory 
attenuation of the effect–stimuli may have increased participants’ tendency to 
experience the stimuli as effects of their own actions even if the primes remained 
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below the threshold of conscious awareness on congruent trials respectively on 
incongruent trials in experiments 3 and 4. Conversely, when an incorrect action 
effect was primed, as it was the case on incongruent trials in experiments 1 and 2 
and on congruent trials in experiments 3 and 4, there should have been no sensory 
attenuation and thus a more pronounced sensory representation of the actual effect–
stimuli. That subliminal primes can indeed cause a sensory attenuation of 
subsequent stimuli is supported by neuroimaging findings showing that stimuli 
preceded by congruent masked primes were associated with a reduced level of 
activation compared to incongruently primed stimuli (Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, 
Le Bihan, Mangin, Poline, & Riviére, 2001). In conclusion, sensory attenuation 
appears to be a plausible explanation for the prime–induced modulation of the 
experience of control observed in the experiments of the present work. However, it 
is clearly up to further investigation to obtain more direct evidence for this 
interpretation. One idea would be to try to identify a physiological correlate for 
sensory attenuation. This could for example be attempted by concomitantly 
measuring the event related potentials in the EEG in a task like the present control 
judgment paradigm. Following the sensory attenuation hypothesis one should 
expect reduced event related potential components after effect-primes which 
activate a correct representation of a subsequent effect. Another idea would be to 
directly manipulate the degree of sensory intensity (e.g. the color density of a 
colored visual effect stimulus, like for instance the color circles used in Experiment 
2) and see whether the degree of sensory intensity correlates with the degree of 
experienced control. Following the sensory attenuation hypothesis one should 
expect a reversed correlation between these variables. That is, the lower the degree 
of sensory intensity the higher should be the degree of experienced control. Apart 
from this it will be an important issue for future research to investigate in more 
detail to what extent experienced control results from unconscious effect–
representations and under which conditions conscious anticipations of action effects 
 94Chapter 4:  General Discussion                                                                                   
___________________________________________________________________________
  
contribute to or may even be required for the experience of voluntary control (cf. 
Linser & Goschke, 2006). 
 
 
 
4. 3 “Voluntary action” investigated in the lab  
 
Can conclusions derived from experimental settings as controlled and artificial as in 
the present investigations be generalized to voluntary action in real life (cf. Goschke 
& Walter, 2005)? In other words, are key–presses appropriate reflections of what we 
consider a voluntary action? In discussions concerning not only the present 
research, but experimental psychological research on voluntary action and 
experienced control in general, critics – especially from other disciplines – often put 
forth that actions as simple as the key–presses used in the present tasks are too 
simple and the visual stimuli used as alleged “effects” too ”trivial”, especifally as 
these actions and effects have no meaning with respect to the participants’ 
intentions or goals. As noted by Goschke and Walter (2005) one should not dismiss 
such qualms too easily – even as a confessing experimental psychologist. By 
definition, experimental settings are highly controlled and thus necessarily artificial. 
Therefore they can hardly, if ever, mimic real life situations perfectly. Key-presses 
are admittedly simple even if they are ”freely chosen” as in the present study. They 
are far less complex than voluntary actions in ”real–life” with respect to their 
consequences and the goals related to them. However, on the other hand, free-
choice key–presses can be considered as truly voluntary actions in the sense that 
they are neither performed automatically nor mapped to external triggers in a fixed 
way, as was the case in most previous studies of voluntary control (e.g., Aarts, 
Custers, & Wegner, 2005). Given that the key–presses in the control judgment tasks 
of Experiments 2 – 4 were self–chosen by the participants after they had consciously 
agreed to participate in the experiment, the key–presses, despite their simplicity, 
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fulfill the critical requirements to be considered as voluntary actions (Goschke & 
Walter, 2005).  
 
Besides, recent experiments in social cognitive psychology show that unconscious 
goals can systematically affect behavior even in more complex and naturalistic 
experimental settings. For instance, in a study by Bargh and his colleagues 
participants performed in a gambling task in which the goal either to perform well or 
to cooperate was activated without the awareness of participants through an 
incidental priming manipulation. Participants were at first instructed to solve a 
“cover-task” in which they were presented with prime words that were either 
related to the behavioral concept of “cooperation” or “achievement” or with neutral 
prime words. The purpose of the primes was to activate either a cooperational, a 
competitive or a neutral behavioural goal for the following gambling task. 
Importantly participants were not informed about the relevance of the primes for 
the following task and remained thus unaware of the relationship and the fact that 
they had undergone a goal priming procedure. However, data analyses revealed 
that the goal-primes had nevertheless systematically biased participants’ gambling 
behavior. Participants receiving the undercover “achievement”-priming achieved 
higher in a competitive intellectual task compared to participants who received 
neutral primes. Respectively participants receiving “cooperation”-primes compared 
to players who had received neutral primes were superior following a strategy in 
which they shared their individual gain with a co–player, thereby increasing the 
final gain for both. As revealed by post-experimental exploration the primes had not 
systematically modulated participants’ experienced intentionality to cooperate or to 
achieve. This suggests that participants were unaware of the activation of the goal 
and of its operation during the gambling performance (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee–Chai, 
Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001). 
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4. 4  Is conscious will an illusion? 
 
The experiments of this dissertation and several related findings in the literature 
demonstrate that the conscious experience of voluntary control can be at variance 
with whether in reality the perceptual event was caused by one’s action or whether 
it derives from an external source. Although the experience of voluntary control is 
often experienced as immediate and we seem to have a privileged introspective 
access to the causes of our actions, this experience can be misled as can be observed 
in psychiatric patients, particularly schizophrenics, who sometimes experience 
”delusions of control” as part of their pathology (e.g. Frith, 1998, 2005), as well as in 
healthy individuals under hypnosis (e.g. Lynn, Rhue, Weekes, 1990; Kirsch & Lynn, 
1998; Spanos, 1986; Haggard, Daffydd, & Oakley, 2004) or under experimental 
treatment (e.g. Wegner & Wheateley, 1999). In line with these observations, the 
results obtained in the present work show that the experience of control can be 
modulated systematically by subliminal effect-primes. Participants experienced an 
illusion of control over in fact uncontrollable events that followed their action to the 
degree that the primed effect anticipation activated a consistent anticipation of that 
post-action event. These findings show that the conscious experience of control does 
not indicate privileged introspective access to the causal antecedents of our action 
but relies rather on a fallible causal attribution (cf. Linser & Goschke, 2006).  
 
Does this conclusion imply that conscious will is an illusion – as has been argued 
eloquently by Wegner (2002)? As Goschke and Walter (2005) argue “the answer to 
this question depends crucially on what is understood by the term illusion in this 
context. Clearly, the present as well as preceding related findings discussed above 
provide convincing evidence against a naïve “Cartesian” view according to which 
the experience of agency and voluntary control rests on a privileged and incorrigible 
introspective access to the causal antecedents of one's actions and their effects. 
Goschke and Walter (2005) further refer to David Hume (1739) who remarked that 
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one can not directly perceive cause–effect relations but rather infer them from the 
observation of systematic relations between events. The authors point our that 
likewise, the experience that one's conscious intentions cause one's actions and that 
one's actions cause certain effects emerges from a fallible causal attribution 
(Goschke & Walter, 2005;  see also Goschke, 2006; Linser & Goschke, 2006). In this 
respect the results of the present work indicate that this attribution does not only 
involve inferences based on conscious expectations about the likely causes of actions 
but is also modulated by unconsciously computed predictions of action effects. 7  
The fact that the processes that compute predictions of immediate action effects can 
operate unconsciously may explain why, from the phenomenological first person 
perspective, the experience of agency and voluntary control often seems so 
immediate and intuitively evident. It may elucidate why we become aware of the 
fact that our cognitive system continuously computes predictions of the sensory 
consequences of our actions primarily when these predictions fail and we are 
confronted with an unexpected action effect. Nevertheless, despite its apparent 
intuitive immediacy, like all causal attributions the processes underlying the feeling 
of agency are clearly fallible and may under certain circumstances elicit the 
erroneous impression that one is the originator of an effect which in reality was 
controlled externally. In line with Goschke (2006; Goschke & Walter, 2005; Goschke 
& Linser, 2006) it can be concluded that in this sense one may indeed regard 
experienced agency and voluntary control as an “illusion”. As Wegner (2002, p. 2) 
notes: „conscious will is an illusion… in the sense that the experience of consciously 
willing an action is not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action”.  
 
As Goschke and Walter (2005) further conclude, this does not entail that the 
conscious experience of voluntary control is an illusion in the sense that it constantly 
deludes us about the causes of our actions and their effects. Leastwise this follows to 
no greater or lesser extent than it follows from the occurrence of perceptual illusions 
                                                 
7 The following conclusions are partly derived from a similar argument made by Goschke & Walter 
(2005; see also Goschke, 2006; Linser & Goschke, 2006; Walter & Goschke, 2006). 
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that perception always deludes us (Goschke & Walter, 2005; Goschke, 2006; Linser & 
Goschke, 2006). Rather the cognitive processes underlying the experience of 
voluntary control   – and in particular the prediction of action effects and the 
comparison of predicted and actual sensory effects of one’s actions – constitute 
highly adaptive mechanisms that generally provide us with valid information about 
whether an event was caused by one’s own action or by some external force. It 
appears unlikely that such a mechanism would have evolved if it constantly 
deceived organisms about the causes and effects of their actions (Goschke & Walter, 
2005; Goschke, 2006). Rather, by continuously comparing predicted with actual 
action–effects a mechanism like this enables us to learn to anticipate increasingly 
better which effects are caused by which actions under which conditions 
(Hoffmann, 1993) and thereby to infer correctly, whether an event was caused by us 
or some external force.Thus, under natural (i.e., non–experimental) conditions, the 
fact that we tend to experience ourselves as originators of events following our 
actions, if the events were correctly anticipated before the action, represents an 
adaptive mechanism that in most cases generates valid inferences as to whether an 
event is generated by one’s own action (Goschke & Walter, 2005; Frith et al., 2000; 
Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004).  
 
In conclusion, the findings of the present work are in line with evidence against a 
Cartesian view according to which the experience of voluntary control rests on a 
privileged and incorrigible introspective access to the causes of our actions and their 
effects. Rather, the experience of control appears to emerge from an – in principle 
fallible – causal attribution which is based on largely unconscious brain processes. It 
is up to future research to investigate under which conditions effect–anticipations 
must be conscious in order to contribute to the experience of control, and when 
experienced control is modulated unconsciously.  
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Chapter 6  
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Willentliches Handeln ist ein fundamentales Verhalten unseres täglichen Lebens. 
Fast ununterbrochen sind wir damit beschäftigt, zu entscheiden, was wir als 
nächstes tun werden. Willentliches Handeln meint hier zielgerichtetes Handeln, d.h., 
Handeln, das dazu dient, einen bestimmten Effekt in unserer Umwelt 
herbeizuführen (vgl. Prinz, 1997). So betätigen wir beispielsweise gezielt einen 
Lichtschalter, um den Raum zu erhellen. Willentliches Handeln hängt daher 
entscheidend von der Fähigkeit ab, zukünftige Effekte unserer Handlungen mental 
zu repräsentieren (Lotze, 1852; James, 1890/1950; Michotte, 1954/1963) und mit den 
zielführenden Handlungen funktional zu assoziieren (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; Prinz, 
1998, 2000; Goschke, 2003, 2004). Mit willentlichem Handeln einher geht eine 
spezifische, uns zutiefst vertraute und für unser menschliches Selbstkonzept 
zentrale bewusste Erfahrung, die Willenserfahrung. Diese vermittelt  uns als 
handelnde Personen die Überzeugung, dass wir es sind, die als Autoren das eigene 
Handeln und die daraus resultierenden Effekte willentlich kontrollieren. Welche 
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Prozesse generieren diese Erfahrung? Mit dieser Frage beschäftigte sich die 
vorliegende Arbeit.  
 
Einer Vielzahl von Forschungsergebnissen zufolge spielt Effektantizipation nicht nur 
beim willentlichen Handeln selbst, sondern auch im Rahmen der Generation der 
Erfahrung willentlicher Kontrolle eine zentrale Rolle (z.B., Michotte, 1954/1963; 
Wegner, 2002, 2003, 2004; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
Ausgehend von dieser Idee wurde in der vorliegenden Arbeit die Annahme 
untersucht, dass ein sensorischer Handlungseffekt insbesondere dann als selbst 
verursacht und durch eigenes Handeln kontrolliert erlebt wird, wenn der Effekt vor 
Ausführung der Handlung korrekt antizipiert wird. Besteht hingegen eine 
wahrgenommene Divergenz zwischen antizipiertem und tatsächlichem Effekt, wird 
dieser als fremd verursacht erlebt und die Kontrolle einem externen Agenten 
zugeschrieben. Varianten  dieser Idee finden sich in verschiedenen neueren 
Konzepten zum willentlichen Handeln (z.B., Frith, 2005; vgl. Haggard, 2005, für 
einen Überblick). So postulieren Blakemore, Wolpert und Frith (2002), dass während 
der Ausführung einer willentlichen Bewegung ein Vorhersage-Modell (forward 
model) die sensorischen Konsequenzen von Bewegungen vorausberechnet. Wenn 
die prognostizierten Konsequenzen mit dem tatsächlichen sensorischen Feedback 
übereinstimmen, erfolgt auf neuronaler Ebene eine Abschwächung der sensorischen 
Repräsentation (sensory attenuation), woraufhin der Effekt als selbst-verursacht 
erlebt wird (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 1998, 2000). Experimentelle Befunde 
anderer Forscher stützen diese Annahme (z.B., Sato and Yasuda, 2005). Auch 
Wegners Theorie der “scheinbaren mentalen Verursachung” schreibt Vorhersagen 
von Handlungen und deren Effekten für die Generierung der Willenserfahrung eine 
Schlüsselrolle zu (Wegner, 2002, 2004). Sein Konzept besagt, dass die 
Willenserfahrung das Ergebnis einer kausalen Schlussfolgerung ist, in der eine 
Handlung genau dann als kausale Folge bewusster Intentionen erlebt wird, wenn 
(1) ein Gedanke (typischerweise eine Intention) unmittelbar vor der Handlung 
auftritt, wenn (2) der Gedanke inhaltlich konsistent mit der Handlung ist, und wenn 
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(3) keine plausiblen alternativen Ursachen für die Handlung ersichtlich sind. 
Basierend auf Antizipationen unserer Handlungen und deren Effekten reflektiert 
die Willenserfahrung demnach die Wahrnehmung eines scheinbaren kausalen 
Pfades zwischen Gedanken und Handlung und ist – wie jede kausale 
Schlussfolgerung – prinzipiell fehlbar (z.B., Wegner & Wheatley, 1999;  Aarts, 
Custers & Wegner, 2005).  
 
Eine der vielen noch weitgehend offenen Fragen betrifft die Frage, ob und 
inwieweit auch unbewusste Effektantizipationen das Ausmaß erlebter Kontrolle 
systematisch beeinflussen können (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2000; Aarts, Custers 
& Wegner, 2005). Zwei Fragen standen daher im Fokus der vorliegenden Arbeit. 
Erstens wurde untersucht, ob eine Illusion von willentlicher Kontrolle über eine – 
objektiv unkontrollierbare – Handlungsfolge mittels Priming einer Repräsentation 
dieses Ereignisses vor der Handlung gezielt induziert werden kann. Zweitens 
wurde untersucht, ob eine solche Modulation bewusster Kontrolle auch dann 
erfolgt, wenn die mittels Priming aktivierte sensorische Repräsentation auf 
unbewusster Ebene erfolgt (vgl. Merikle, Smilek & Eastwood, 2001; Merikle & 
Reingold, 1998; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Eimer & 
Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003). Mit dem Ziel der empirischen Untersuchung dieser 
Fragen, wurde ein Kontroll-Urteil-Paradigma entworfen. Darin hatten Probanden 
die Aufgabe, jeweils eine von zwei Handlungen auszuführen (linker oder rechter 
Tastendruck), die von jeweils einem von zwei visuellen Reizen gefolgt war. Mittels 
Tastendrücken hatten die Probanden entweder ein gewisses limitiertes Maß an 
Kontrolle (Exp. 1) oder überhaupt keine Kontrolle (Exp. 2-4) darüber, welcher 
Stimulus nach einem Tastendruck jeweils erschien. Unmittelbar vor jeder Handlung 
wurde ein maskierter, d.h., nicht wahrnehmbarer Prime-Reiz präsentiert, der 
entweder kongruent oder inkongruent mit dem Post-Handlungs-„Effekt“reiz war.  
 
Es wurde vorhergesagt, dass subliminales “Primen” der Repräsentation des Post-
Handlungs-Reizes vor jeder Handlung zu einer systematischen Überschätzung der 
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erlebten Kontrolle über die vermeintlichen Handlungs“effekte“ führte. Wenn 
mittels Priming keine oder eine inkongruente ”Effekt”-Repräsentation induziert 
würde, wurde ein im Mittel geringer eingeschätztes Kontrollmaß erwartet. Die 
kritische Idee dieser Vorhersage war es, den Mechanismus, der normalerweise die 
internalen Vorhersagen von Handlungseffekten berechnet, mit einem externalen 
Prime, der eine Effektrepräsentation unmittelbar vor einer willentlichen Handlung 
aktiviert, systematisch “auszutricksen”. Die Ergebnisse der vier Experimente 
bestätigten diese Erwartung. Damit stützten sie die Annahme, dass Effekt-
Antizipationen und ein Vergleichsprozess zwischen antizipierten und 
wahrgenommenen Handlungskonsequenzen eine Schlüsselrolle im willentlichen 
Handeln und der damit einhergehenden Erfahrung von Kontrolle spielen. So 
variierte das Ausmaß erlebter Kontrolle systematisch in Abhängigkeit von der 
Übereinstimmung zwischen antizipierten und tatsächlichen Handlungs-
konsequenzen. Bei Übereinstimmung von antizipiertem und tatsächlichem Effekt 
schätzten Personen im Mittel Handlungseffekte als höher selbst kontrolliert ein als 
im Fall der Divergenz von antizipiertem und tatsächlichem Effekt. Wie die 
vorliegenden Ergebnisse zeigten, trat diese Variation sogar dann auf, wenn die 
Probanden tatsächlich keine Kontrolle über die “Effekt“-reize hatten und, wenn die 
prä-aktionalen Effektrepräsentationen dem Bewusstsein unzugänglich waren.  
 
Zusammenfassend unterstützen die Ergebnisse Ansätze, die Intentionen und 
Zielvorstellungen eine indirekte, unbewusste und langfristig wirksame Rolle in der 
Kausalkette willentlichen Handelns zuschreiben. Diese konzipieren Intentionen als 
„kognitive Randbedingungen“ (constraints), die das kognitive System eines 
Handelnden so „konfigurieren“, dass eine erhöhte Bereitschaft zur Ausführung 
willentlicher Handlungen besteht, sobald geeignete Auslösebedingungen vorliegen 
(vgl., Goschke, 1996, 2002; Jordan, 2003; Hommel, 2000; Neumann & Prinz, 1987).  
 
Bezogen auf die vieldiskutierte Frage, ob der bewusste Wille eine Illusion ist (z.B. 
Wegner, 2002, 2005), implizieren diese Ergebnisse dabei nicht, dass die Erfahrung 
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willentlicher Kontrolle grundsätzlich eine Illusion ist (vgl. Goschke & Walter, 2006; 
Linser & Goschke, 2006). Die systematische Modulierbarkeit von Mechanismen wie 
die Vorhersage von Handlungseffekten und Vergleich von vorhergesagten und 
tatsächlichen Konsequenzen von Handlungen, steht in Einklang mit der 
Notwendigkeit, hoch adaptiv zu sein. So lernen wir im Laufe unserer Entwicklung 
durch kontinuierlich das Handeln begleitende Vergleichsprozesse von 
vorhergesagten und tatsächlichen Handlungseffekten immer besser zu antizipieren, 
welche Effekte mit welcher Handlung und unter welchen Bedingungen erzeugt 
werden (Hoffmann, 1993). Und dabei lernen wir korrekt zu folgern, ob ein Effekt 
durch uns oder durch eine externe Quelle verursacht war. 
 
 
Literatur:  
Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Wegner, D.M. (2005). On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing 
experienced agency by priming effect information. Consciousness & Cognition, 14, 439–458.  
 
Blakemore, S.–J., Wolpert, D.M., & Frith, C.D. (1998). Central cancellation of self–produced tickle 
sensation. Nature Neuroscience, 1, 635–640. 
 
Blakemore, S.–J., Wolpert, D.M., & Frith, C.D. (2000). Why can’t you tickle yourself? NeuroReport, 11/11, 
R11–R16. 
 
Blakemore, S.–J., Wolpert, D.M., & Frith, C.D. (2002). Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends 
in Cognitive Science, 6/6, 237–242. 
 
Dehaene, S., & Nacchache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic 
evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79, 1–37. 
 
Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (1998). Effects of masked stimuli: Behavioural and electrophysiological 
evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24/6, 1737–1747. 
 
Eimer, M., & Schlaghecken, F. (2003). Response facilitation and inhibition in subliminal priming. 
Biological Psychology, 64/1–2, 7–26. 
 
Elsner, B., & Hommel, B. (2001). Effect anticipation and action control. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 27/1, 229–240. 
 
Frith, C.D. (2005). The neural basis of hallucinations and delusions. C.R. Biologies, 328, 169–175. 
 
Goschke, T. (1996). Wille und Kognition. Zur funktionalen Architektur der intentionalen 
Handlungssteuerung. In J. Kuhl, & H. Heckhausen (eds.), Enzyklopädie der Psychologie, Serie IV, 
Vol. 4: Motivation, Volition und Handeln, 583–663. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
 
Goschke, T. (2002). Volition und kognitive Kontrolle. In J. Müsseler, & W. Prinz (eds.), Allgemeine 
Psychologie, 271–335. Heidelberg: Spektrum Akademischer Verlag.  
 
  
Chapter 6:    Zusammenfassung                                                                                      119 
__________________________________________________________________________
  
Goschke, T. (2003). Voluntary action and cognitive control from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. 
In W. Prinz, S. Maasen, & G. Roth (eds.), Voluntary action: an issue at the Interface of nature and 
culture, 49–85. Oxford, England: University Press. 
 
Goschke, T. (2004). Vom freien Willen zur Selbstdetermination. Kognitive und volitionale 
Mechanismen der intentionalen Handlungssteuerung. Psychologische Rundschau, 55/4, 186–197. 
 
Goschke, T., & Walter, H. (2005). Bewusstsein und Willensfreiheit: Philosophische und empirische 
Annäherungen. In C. Herrmann, M. Pauen, J. Rieger, & S. Schicktanz (eds.), Bewusstsein – 
Perspektivenwechsel zwischen den Disziplinen. Stuttgart: UTB.  
 
Haggard, P. (2005). Conscious intention and motor cognition. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 290–295.  
 
Hoffmann, J. (1993). Vorhersage und Erkenntnis. Göttingen: Hogrefe.  
 
Hommel, B. (2000) The prepared reflex: Automaticity and control in stimulus–response translation. In 
S. Monsell, & J. Driver (eds.). Control of Cognitive Processes: Attention and Performance XVII, 247–
273. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology, Vols. I & II. New York: Dover Publications, 1950. 
 
Jordan, J.S. (2003). Emergence of self and other in perception and action: an event–control approach. 
Consciousness & Cognition, 12/4, 633–46. 
 
Linser, K., & Goschke, T. (2006). Unconscious modulation of the conscious experience of voluntary 
control. Cognition, in press. 
 
Lotze, R.H. (1852). Medicinische Psychologie oder die Physiologie der Seele. Leipzig, Germany: Weidmann. 
 
Merikle, P.M., & Reingold, E.M. (1998). On demonstrating unconscious perception. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 304–310. 
 
Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D., & Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: Perspectives from 
cognitive psychology. Cognition, 79, 115–134. 
 
Michotte, A. (1954). The perception of causality. trans. T.R. Miles & E. Miles. New York. Basic Books, 
1963. 
 
Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2001). Unconscious semantic priming extends to novel unseen stimuli. 
Cognition, 80, 215–229. 
 
Neumann, O., & Prinz, W. (1987). Kognitive Antezedenzien von Willkürhandlungen. In P.M. 
Gollwitzer, H. Heckhausen, & F.E. Weinert (eds.), Jenseits des Rubikon: Der Wille in den 
Humanwissenschaften, 195–215. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9/2, 129–154. 
 
Prinz, W. (1998). Die Reaktion als Willenshandlung. Psychologische Rundschau, 49/1, 10–20. 
 
Prinz, W. (2000). Kognitionspsychologische Handlungsforschung. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 208, 32–54.  
 
Sato, A., & Yasuda, A. (2005). Illusion of sense of self–agency: Discrepancy between the predicted and 
actual sensory consequences of actions modulates the sense of self–agency, but not the sense of 
self–ownership. Cognition, 94, 241–255. 
 
Wegner, D.M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Wegner, D.M. (2003). The mind's best trick: How we experience conscious will. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 7, 65–69. 
 
Wegner, D.M. (2004). Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27, 649–692.  
 
Wegner, D.M., & Wheatley, T.P. (1999). Why it feels as if we are doing things: Sources of the experience 
of will, American Psychologist, 54, 480–492. 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
Appendix 
 Chapter 7:    Appendix                                                                                                     121 __________________________________________________________________________
  
Appendix A 
 
Appendix A 1: Control judgment-questionnaire in Exp. 1 
 
 
1) Bitte schätzen Sie ein, ob und wenn ja inwieweit Sie durch das Drücken von roter 
oder blauer Taste beeinflussen konnten, ob die nachfolgenden Pfeile nach links 
oder rechts zeigten! 
 
 
 Kreuzen Sie an, wie hoch der Einfluss Ihrer Tastendrücke war!  
 
Ich glaube, durch meine Tastendrücke hatte ich..... 
 
 
          
          
0%                                        50%     100% 
überhaupt keinen Einfluss                                          mittleren Einfluss                                                       vollständigen Einfluss         
                                                                         ....ob die Pfeile nach links oder rechts zeigten. 
 
 
2) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, durch eine der beiden Tasten mehr Kontrolle ausüben 
zu können als durch die andere? 
 
 □ nein 
 □ ja, durch die rote Taste 
 □  ja, durch die blaue Taste 
 
3) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, dass eine der beiden Pfeilrichtungen besser durch Ihre 
Tastendrücke beeinflussbar  war?  
 
 □ nein 
 □ ja, der Pfeil nach links war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 □  ja, der Pfeil nach rechts war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 
 
4) Haben Sie eine Idee, durch welchen Tastendruck welche Pfeilrichtung folgte? 
Diese Frage brauchen Sie nur zu beantworten, wenn Sie dazu eine „Theorie“ 
haben! 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
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Appendix A 2: Control judgment-questionnaire in Exp. 2 
 
 
1) Bitte schätzen Sie ein, ob und wenn ja inwieweit Sie durch das Drücken von linker 
und rechter Taste beeinflussen konnten, welcher der beiden Kreise – blau oder 
gelb – jeweils als nächster auf dem Bildschirm erschien! 
 
 Kreuzen Sie an, wie hoch der Einfluss Ihrer Tastendrücke war!  
 
Ich glaube, durch meine Tastendrücke hatte ich..... 
 
 
          
          
0%                                        50%     100% 
überhaupt keinen Einfluss                                          mittleren Einfluss                                                       vollständigen Einfluss 
        
                                                            ....über das Erscheinen von blauem und gelbem Kreis. 
 
 
 
2) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, durch eine der beiden Tasten mehr Kontrolle ausüben 
zu können als durch die andere? 
 
 □ nein 
 □ ja, durch die linke Taste 
 □  ja, durch die rechte Taste 
 
 
3) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, dass das Erscheinen von blauem und gelbem Kreis in 
unterschiedlichem Maße durch Ihre Tastendrücke beeinflussbar  war?  
 
 □ nein, kein Unterschied in der Beeinflussbarkeit von blauem und gelbem Kreis 
 □ ja, der blaue Kreis war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 □  ja, der gelbe Kreis war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 
 
4) Haben Sie eine Idee, durch welchen Tastendruck welcher Kreis erscheint? Diese 
Frage brauchen Sie nur zu beantworten, wenn Sie dazu eine „Theorie“ haben! 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
 Chapter 7:    Appendix                                                                                                     123 __________________________________________________________________________
  
 
 
Appendix A 3: Control judgment-questionnaire in Exp. 3 
 
 
1) Bitte schätzen Sie ein, ob und wenn ja inwieweit Sie durch das Drücken von linker 
und rechter Taste beeinflussen konnten, ob als nächstes Raute oder Quadrat auf 
dem Bildschirm erschien! 
 
 Kreuzen Sie an, wie hoch der Einfluss Ihrer Tastendrücke war!  
 
Ich glaube, durch meine Tastendrücke hatte ich..... 
 
 
          
          
0%                                        50%     100% 
überhaupt keinen Einfluss                                          mittleren Einfluss                                                       vollständigen Einfluss 
        
                                                            ....über das Erscheinen von Raute und Quadrat. 
 
 
2) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, durch eine der beiden Tasten mehr Kontrolle ausüben 
zu können als durch die andere? 
 
 □ nein 
 □ ja, durch die linke Taste 
 □  ja, durch die rechte Taste 
 
 
3) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, dass das Erscheinen von Raute oder Quadrat in 
unterschiedlichem Maße durch Ihre Tastendrücke beeinflussbar  war?  
 
 □ nein, kein Unterschied  
 □ ja, die Raute war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 □  ja, das Quadrat war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 
 
4) Haben Sie eine Idee, durch welchen Tastendruck welches Symbol erscheint? Diese 
Frage brauchen Sie nur zu beantworten, wenn Sie dazu eine „Theorie“ haben! 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
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Appendix A 4: Judgment-questionnaire of “effect”-predictability 
in Exp. 4 
 
1)  Bitte schätzen Sie ein, wie hoch die Trefferquote Ihrer Vorhersagen für Raute und 
Quadrat war!  
 
Meine Vorhersagen für Raute und Quadrat waren zutreffend in..... 
 
          
          
0%                                                                                                  50%     100% 
        (nie)                                                                                           (manchmal)                                                                                       (immer) 
 
                                                               ......aller Fälle.     
 
2)  Glauben Sie, für eines der beiden Objekte bessere Vorhersagen getroffen zu 
haben? 
 □ nein 
 □ ja, für die Raute 
 □  ja, für das Quadrat 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
3) Hatten Sie den Eindruck, dass das Erscheinen von Raute oder Quadrat in 
unterschiedlichem Maße durch Ihre Tastendrücke beeinflussbar  war?  
 
 □ nein, kein Unterschied in der Beeinflussbarkeit von Raute und Quadrat 
 □ ja, die Raute war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 □ ja, das Quadrat war in höherem Maße beeinflussbar 
 
 
5) Sonstige Bemerkungen? 
 
 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix B 1: Prime identification-questionnaire in Exp. 1 
 
 
1) Konnten Sie erkennen, dass vor dem „Mustermix“ noch etwas gezeigt wurde? 
 
   □ ja 
   □ nein 
 
 
 
2) Konnten Sie erkennen, was vor dem „Mustermix“ gezeigt wurde? 
 
   □ ja,    und zwar: 
   □ nein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
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Appendix B 2: Prime identification-questionnaire in Exp. 2 
 
 
1) Konnten Sie erkennen, dass vor dem Buchstabengemisch noch etwas gezeigt 
wurde? 
 
   □ ja 
   □ nein 
 
 
 
3) Konnten Sie erkennen, was vor dem Buchstabengemisch gezeigt wurde? 
 
   □ ja,    und zwar: 
   □ nein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
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Appendix B 3: Prime identification-questionnaire in Exp. 3 + 4 
 
 
1) Konnten Sie erkennen, dass vor dem Erscheinen des Sterns noch etwas gezeigt 
wurde? 
 
   □ ja 
   □ nein 
 
 
 
4) Konnten Sie erkennen, was vor dem Stern gezeigt wurde? 
 
   □ ja,    und zwar: 
   □ nein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jetzt geht es wieder am PC weiter! 
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